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the rule of law as exempliﬁed 
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religious dimension in society 
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Just Lawyers
Ralph R. Mabey
TJ I L L U S T R A T I O N S  B YU
I’m honored that each of you would come. I am, after all, just a lawyer. Indeed,
the title of my comments is “Just Lawyers”!  >> I respect you. I respect you
because you would come out on a Sunday evening after a long day. I know it’s a
sacriﬁce. I respect you because of your attendance and study of the law at the J.
Reuben Clark Law School. I have a vision of great things that will come from you
through your studies and your careers. >> The theme of Discovery Week is “So
we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another”
(Romans 12:5). >> Now, how might you say that in Latin? E pluribus unum.
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by Ralph R . Mabey

E Pluribus Unum: the motto of the
Great Seal of the United States of
America. In other words, I submit to you
that the purpose of the laws of this land is
to make of many one. This is not just the
purpose of the Constitution but the pur-
pose of all of the laws of this land.
Take the example of two parties who
are entering into a contract. They’ve got dif-
ferent interests. One wants to sell high, the
other wants to buy low. One wants to sell
for cash, the other wants to buy on terms.
The contract laws of this country
allow them to be brought together. Their
very different interests are brought
together in one agreement. They are uni-
ﬁed and enabled to work together for
their separate interests—uniﬁed by the law.
Now suppose they have a dispute and
one claims breach of the contract by the
other. The law is still there to forge a com-
promise. It gives them something to com-
promise around, a chance for them to
reunify themselves based upon the princi-
ples of the law. Or, if they’re unable to
reunify themselves, they can reconcile
themselves to each other through the
enforcement of the law in court—whose
purpose is then to reconcile this unhappy
seller with this unhappy buyer.
Think about it. There is something
profound in the purpose of our laws when
seen in this context.
Even the criminal laws are there to
unify us in obedience to those laws and, in
the event of a breach of the criminal law,
to reconcile the offender with the rest of
society, to reconcile that offender through
enforcement of the law.
Scripture recognizes that this is the
purpose of the civil law. By “civil law,” I
mean the secular law.
Doctrine and Covenants 134:6 says of
our laws: “We believe that every man
should be honored in his station, rulers
and magistrates as such, being placed for
the protection of the innocent and the
punishment of the guilty; and that to the
laws all men show respect and deference,
as without them peace and harmony would
be supplanted by anarchy and terror; human
laws being instituted for the express purpose
of regulating our interests as individuals and
nations, between man and man; and divine
laws given of heaven, prescribing rules on
spiritual concerns, for faith and worship,
both to be answered by man to his
Maker” (emphasis added).
What is meant here? Harmonize? Bring
peace between human beings? The purpose of
the law, according to scripture, is to unify us.
So now we come to the next question:
If the purpose of the civil law is to unify
us, what is the purpose of lawyers? Can it
be that the purpose of lawyers is to unify
persons? To harmonize my client’s interests
with your client’s interests so that we can
do a deal, so that you can go about your
business? To reconcile our clients with
their adversaries so that they can get on
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with their lives? Is the purpose of lawyers
to unify humankind through adherence to
law and/or reconcile humankind through
the operation of law?
Perhaps nobody has heard people say
that is the duty of lawyers. But it is the
divine purpose of our laws—to unify us,
separate and different though we are. Then
is the divine purpose of lawyers to take us,
separate and apart, and unify us under the
law or reconcile us with the law?
I submit, brothers and sisters, that that
is the purpose of a lawyer: to unify us
under the law or reconcile us with the law.
And only one of you laughed out loud. I
would expect more of you to laugh out
loud. It seems counterintuitive to the way
we picture lawyers. But I want you to
think about this because I submit to you
that it is true. 
I believe with this purpose in mind—
that lawyers are to unify—the Lord said:
“We believe that men should appeal to
the civil law for redress of all wrongs
and grievances, where personal abuse is
inﬂicted or the right of property or
character infringed, where such laws
exist as will protect the same [and such
appeals are made by lawyers]; but we
believe that all men are justiﬁed in
defending themselves, their friends, and
property, and the government, from the
unlawful assaults and encroachments of
all persons in times of exigency, where
immediate appeal cannot be made to the
laws, and relief afforded” (Doctrine and
Covenants 134:11).
To put it another way, no law enforces
itself, no law interprets itself. If the 
purpose of the law is e pluribus unum, 
then the purpose of a lawyer is to effect
e pluribus unum.
I submit that it is important even to
the salvation of Zion, therefore, that we
study the law. Indeed, the Lord said in
Doctrine and Covenants 93:53: “And, verily
I say unto you, that it is my will that you
should hasten to translate my scriptures,
and to obtain a knowledge of history, and
of countries, and of kingdoms, of laws of
God and man, and all this for the salvation
of Zion. Amen” (emphasis added).
From this I take it the Lord says that
for the salvation of Zion we should study
the law of man and become lawyers.
Now I’m likening this scripture to me
and to you. But if Nephi could liken
them, perhaps we all can. Out of that, I
take a divine call to you and to me to
study the law.
I believe then, with the purpose of
lawyers in mind, that we must befriend
the law. We must seek for wise lawyers
and magistrates and persons who will
rule on the law. You can tell that I’m
referring to scripture. “And that law 
of the land which is constitutional . . .
belongs to all mankind. . . . I . . . justify
you . . . in befriending that law.” It is
lawyers who most befriend the law. 
“I, the Lord God, make you free, there-
fore ye are free indeed; and the law also
maketh you free.” That reference has to
be to secular law, I believe. 
In their entirety these verses read: 
“And that law of the land which is
constitutional, supporting that principle
of freedom in maintaining rights and priv-
ileges, belongs to all mankind, and is justi-
ﬁable before me.
“Therefore, I, the Lord, justify you,
and your brethren of my church, in
befriending that law which is the constitu-
tional law of the land;
“And as pertaining to law of man,
whatsoever is more or less than this,
cometh of evil.
“I, the Lord God, make you free,
therefore ye are free indeed; and the law
also maketh you free.
“Nevertheless, when the wicked rule
the people mourn.
“Wherefore, honest men and wise
men should be sought for diligently, and
good men and wise men ye should
observe to uphold; otherwise whatso-
ever is less than these cometh of evil”
(Doctrine and Covenants 98:5–10).
I take out of all of these scriptures
that, yes, maybe the Lord recognizes that
it is our divine obligation to give effect to
the motto of the United States of America.
As we—through lawyers, I submit—
gain power to organize our businesses,
organize our human transactions and rela-
tions, and organize the Church, we will be
preserved in and able to keep the laws of
God. In other words, now I’m ready to take
one further step. The step I’m going to take
is to suggest that by lawyers acting in their
divine calling to unify people under the law,
they are partially fulﬁlling the divine law
stated in Romans, that we should each
unify ourselves together under Christ.
You may not want to take that leap
with me. But let me read from Doctrine
and Covenants 44:1–5: 
“Behold, thus saith the Lord unto you
my servants, it is expedient in me that the
elders of my church should be called
together, from the east and from the west,
and from the north and from the south,
by letter or some other way.
“And it shall come to pass, that inas-
much as they are faithful, and exercise
faith in me, I will pour out my Spirit upon
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“So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and
every one members one of another.”—ROMANS 12:5
them in the day that they assemble them-
selves together.
“And it shall come to pass that they
shall go forth into the regions round about,
and preach repentance unto the people.
“And many shall be converted, inso-
much that ye shall obtain power to organize
yourselves according to the laws of man.
“That your enemies may not have
power over you; that you may be preserved
in all things; that you may be enabled to keep
my laws; that every bond may be broken
wherewith the enemy seeketh to destroy
my people” (emphasis added).
There you have it. I submit that the
Lord is saying that if you are going to be
enabled to keep that divine law that Paul
spoke about in Romans, it will be by
organizing yourselves according to the
laws of man.
I believe we can see the fulﬁllment of
divine purposes by the unifying action of
lawyers under the law. We can see Professor
Wardle, who is here tonight, and other pro-
fessors at this university and other legal
powers at work in the world, attempting to
unify the world through adherence to just
law—and thereby opening the world and
her peoples to the gospel.
I submit that there is a logical and
scriptural basis for the progression that
I’ve proposed to you this evening. If that’s
the case, that’s all well and good. But I
have to make a living practicing law, and
some of you may have to, too.
Can we practice law as the Lord has
outlined that we should practice the law,
by unifying one with another, by reconcil-
ing our clients with others? I think that is
an important question.
Could we follow the example of
Christ? Isn’t He our lawyer with the
Father? Don’t we read in Jacob 3:1 that
“He will console you in your afﬂictions,
He will plead your cause, and send down
justice”? “But behold, I, Jacob, would
speak unto you that are pure in heart.
Look unto God with ﬁrmness of mind,
and pray unto him with exceeding faith,
and he will console you in your afﬂic-
tions, and he will plead your cause, and
send down justice upon those who seek
your destruction.” We can console and
plead. We can’t send down justice, but we
can try to go get justice.
I think that when it comes down to
the practice of law, we can be most suc-
cessful if we fulﬁll our calling to unify and
reconcile people with each other and the
law. We need to seek common ground, to
narrow differences.
A few years ago I went to a dinner with
my legal adversaries. I represented a client
that was missing more than a billion dollars
and couldn’t ﬁnd it under any rock or
under any bed. The bad guys sat across the
table at dinner; we had fought for a couple
of years. All of a sudden we reached a com-
promise—and it had a spiritual undertone
to it. Opposing counsel spoke later of the
occasion as a dramatic, unexpected, and
crucial reconciliation and uniﬁcation.
I submit to you that settlements under
the law are part of our duty, our divine
duty in unifying and narrowing the
ground. If we do that, we reduce the trans-
action costs greatly. We reduce the psychic
costs, too, and we allow people to go for-
ward, to move on.
I conducted a mediation in a hard-
fought lawsuit a few weeks ago. These par-
ties settled after a day’s mediation. They
were apart millions at the beginning of the
day (several hundreds of percent in magni-
tude), and both sides expressed mistrust
and pessimism. But they settled. One of the
parties said to me, “You know, I didn’t real-
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ize that my adversary was a pretty good
guy. I could have picked up the phone three
years ago and we could have settled this.”
There is power in narrowing issues, in
ﬁnding common ground. There is great
lawyering in that effort.
A few years ago I was involved in a
case where hundreds of millions had been
lost, rather publicly, by a rather public
family. I ended up mediating a dispute
between the family and the party who was
suing the family and had gone to the trou-
ble of ﬁling rico charges against them. It
was a nasty dustup.
We sat together for three or four days.
One night at about 8 or 9 or 10 o’clock, I
was thinking, “This is going nowhere. I
should have broken things off and gone to
the baseball game.” But the parties began
talking together without me and without
lawyers. By 7:00 a.m. the next morning, we
had a settlement.
Well, I asked myself, “What are all we
lawyers doing?” These parties got together
and settled it themselves after years and
much acrimony.
You know, there is a force, a power, 
in narrowing differences, and there’s
sometimes a religious component in it. 
It feels right.
Recently a respected trial judge assisted
the parties in a large and disputatious case
to reach a global settlement. This judge, a
devout Catholic, assesses and reassesses his
life at the end of each day. In so doing, he
concluded that participating in this settle-
ment was probably his ﬁnest day on the
bench—ever—exceeding the many years of
trials and adjudications at which he had
presided and which he had decided.
Another way we can unify is by seek-
ing just results, seeking a just reconcilia-
tion by enforcing the law. You know, if
you’ve got the power and you’ve got the
money and you’ve got the people in your
law ﬁrm, you can pulverize the other guy.
But J. Reuben Clark, Jr., who served
decades as an international lawyer before
his call to the First Presidency, said, “Even
in war, there should be some things that
human beings would not do to their fel-
lows.” He opposed one-sided settlements
or treaties based upon one party’s over-
whelming ﬁrepower.1 He said, “Guns and
bayonets will in the future as in the past
bring truces, long or short, but never
peace that endures. I believe that moral
force is far more potent than physical
force in international relations.”2
Now just a minute here. “I believe that
moral force is far more potent than physi-
cal force in international relations,” said J.
Reuben Clark, Jr. The moral force of inter-
national law and international opinion may
unify people better and forge peace and
truces better than guns and bayonets.
There is some truth to this, I submit, 
in our practice of law. That truth is that 
if you can reach a fair settlement, that set-
tlement is likely to stick. It’s likely to be
enforced. Those parties are likely to be able
to do business with each other again in the
future. They’re likely to get on with their
lives. Justice is more likely to be done.
If it’s just guns and bayonets, then it’s
going to be expensive. It’s going to go on 
a long time, and any peace achieved may
well later fall out of bed.
So I believe also in this principle:
Fulﬁlling a lawyer’s divine calling makes
good sense in the practice of law.
Now what about respecting diversity,
a fundamental precept of Discovery Week? 
E pluribus unum. The idea in Romans
is not that we are homogenized—the idea
is out of many, one. It is that the arm and
the ankle and the elbow and the eye can
be uniﬁed in purpose. So it is in the prac-
tice of law: We must work together with
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diverse peoples in bringing about unity.
That is our calling.
You need go no further than the seller
and the buyer. They’ve got very diverse
interests. Your job is to allow them to do
the business they want to do uniﬁed under
the umbrella of that law, in their diversity.
Diversity is crucial to entrepreneurial
success. It’s crucial to the energy of this
country. As we unify, we must respect
diversity.
As President J. Reuben Clark began
his assignment as ambassador to Mexico,
he adopted this credo: “There are no ques-
tions arising between nations which may
not be adjusted peaceably and in good
feeling, as well as with reciprocal advan-
tage, if those questions are discussed with
kindly candor, with a mutual appreciation
of and accommodation to the point of
view of each by the other, and with
patience and a desire to work out fair and
equitable justice.”3
When he was ambassador to Mexico,
President Clark ﬁlled one of the most
important ambassadorships in the world.
There were momentous disputes between
the u.s. and Mexico. There were upheavals
and internal armed conﬂicts and boundary
disputes with us. There were calls for
armed u.s. intervention.
J. Reuben Clark served seven presidents
of the United States as their lawyer, as
undersecretary of state, as the chief legal
ofﬁcer for the Department of State, and in
many other assignments, as well as ambas-
sador to Mexico. He knew the interna-
tional law, and he said the way to forge
agreement is peaceably, with good feeling,
through questions discussed with candor,
mutual appreciation, and accommodation
of each other’s point of view, through desire
to work out fair and equitable justice.
What happened when he left the
ambassadorship? This is what the Mexico
City Excelsior editorialized: Ambassador
Clark had “distinguished himself by a
virtue that is not common among diplo-
mats: that of not putting himself forward,
of not calling attention to himself, of
observing a prudent reserve that has won
him the esteem of all social classes in
Mexico.”4 He practiced what he intended
to practice.
There is, I think, a great lesson in that:
have respect for your adversary. How often
are we or the other side painted as Satan
simply because we play adversarial roles in
our judicial system? It makes it very difﬁ-
cult to unify our differing interests.
There has been and is discrimination
in this country. A friend told me of a kid
who went to work at a great Los Angeles
law ﬁrm not too many years ago and real-
ized that he was making a thousand dol-
lars less than the others in his class. He
8 Clark Memorandum
The arm and the ankle and the elbow and the eye can
be uniﬁed in purpose. So it is in the practice of law.
went to the senior partner and com-
plained. The senior partner said without
apology, “We can pay you less. You’re
Jewish. Where else are you going to get a
job for more?”
A professor friend of mine who is pre-
eminent in her ﬁeld tells of standing up for
a client in court for the ﬁrst time. The
judge looked over his glasses and said to
her client, not realizing that she might
have a woman lawyer, “Don’t you have a
lawyer?” Well, that judge was very apolo-
getic. But it may have been the ﬁrst time
he had seen a woman lawyer—and it was
not many years ago.
A person of color, a student of mine,
reminded me that a few years ago, to
travel in this great country, his family had
to take their food with them and sleep in
the car. Discrimination is unfortunately
still with us.
There are strong differences among us.
Our job is to respect those with whom and
against whom and for whom we practice
law and to forge unity. That means no eth-
nic or cultural jokes, brothers and sisters.
That means that even if she tells a joke on
herself, I will not repeat that joke. If I tell a
joke about Mormons, that’s ﬁne. If you tell
a joke about Mormons, that’s not so ﬁne
with me. It means not saying things like,
“Yeah, some of my best friends are
Mormons. I took a Mormon to lunch last
week.” Do you feel the condescension in
that? We have got to be careful about what
we say, even when we have good intentions.
The J. Reuben Clark Law Society
stands for these principles of J. Reuben
Clark, these principles of e pluribus unum,
of unifying the world under law, whether
as graduates of this law school or any
other law school, whether as members of
this faith or of any other faith.
I was moved when the J. Reuben
Clark Law Society in Salt Lake City pre-
sented its annual award to Nick Colessides
of the Greek community. The Greek
Orthodox clergy appeared at that lun-
cheon in the Joseph Smith Building, hon-
oring him and honoring us. Lawyering is
building these bridges. That is what the J.
Reuben Clark Law Society is all about.
That is its mission.
I have one other radical suggestion for
you on the practice of law. This time you
can all laugh out loud. You will be success-
ful and you will be living the scriptural
admonitions for lawyers and the law if
you will practice the paradox of humility.
You will be smarter, better, and more suc-
cessful if you are humble. It makes you
happier. Someone said, “Too many humble
people are proud of it.” So I can’t speak for
myself. But I speak for you, brothers and
sisters. (In general priesthood meeting last
October, Bishop Richard C. Edgley spoke
of the paradox or irony that strength
comes from humility.)
The way you become the best trial
lawyer you can is with the humility to
learn from what that witness tells you, to
learn how that other attorney does it.
You may say, “Michael Jordan, he’s
not humble. He says, ‘Give me the ball.’”
And that’s what a good lawyer says: “Give
me the ball.”
How did Michael Jordan come to
want to get the ball and to know what to
do with it? He did it through the humility
of working harder than others, of learning
everything about his opponents, of learn-
ing every move from the other guy and
employing it. There is the paradox in
humility.
You will be a smarter lawyer, a happier
lawyer, and a better lawyer if you—if we—
can learn that paradox. Learn to say to the
client who says, “You’re charging me 500
bucks an hour. What’s the answer?” “I
don’t know the answer.” Learn not to take
credit for every deal. Just get it done even
though you’re thinking, “I’ve got to be out
there self-promoting myself or I’ll starve
to death.” Your work and your service will
promote you.
I’ll close with scriptural proof of 
this paradox, expressed in Helaman 3:35:
“Nevertheless they did fast and pray oft,
and did wax stronger and stronger in their
humility, and ﬁrmer and ﬁrmer in the faith
of Christ, unto the ﬁlling their souls with
joy and consolation, yea, even to the puri-
fying and the sanctiﬁcation of their hearts,
which sanctiﬁcation cometh because of
their yielding their hearts unto God.” Now
there’s the paradox, and I think it applies
to us temporally as well as spiritually.
And in Ether 12:27 we read, “And if
men come unto me I will show unto them
their weakness. I give unto men weakness
that they may be humble; and my grace is
sufﬁcient for all men that humble them-
selves before me; for if they humble them-
selves before me, and have faith in me,
then will I make weak things become
strong unto them.”
We become strong through the humil-
ity to pray, through the humility to let the
Lord know that we’re imperfect, and
through the humility of repentance. We
become strong in the practice of law
through the humility to learn from the
other person, to listen to others, even to
adversaries, and to change ourselves for
the better.
In conclusion, I submit this: It isn’t
that there is a religious life we live and a
lawyer’s life we live and that we’d better
try to reconcile them as best we can. No,
I’m proposing something maybe a little
more dramatic: that they are the same 
life, that your calling as a lawyer under 
e pluribus unum is part of your calling as a
disciple of Christ under Romans 12:5. I say
this in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen.
notes
1 Edwin Brown Firmage & Christopher L. Blakesley, J. Reuben
Clark, Jr.: Law and International Order, 13 byu Studies 273
(1973), p. 81.
2 Id., at 68.
3 Frank W. Fox, J. Reuben Clark, The Public Years (1980), at 549.
4 Id, at 583.
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Morality and 
The following speech was presented at the J. Reuben Clark Law School Founders Day dinner on September 2, 1999.
Professional Ethics
b y  E l d e r  D a l l i n  H . O a k s  
Photography by robb hanks
Mydear 
brothers and 
sisters, I feel very 
privileged to 
have been invited 
to address this
Founders Day 
observance of byu’s 
J. Reuben Clark 
Law School.
Less obvious is how I have found time to
prepare these remarks. It could not have
been done without the valuable research
assistance of Pamela B. Hunsaker and
Marianne M. Jennings, as well as a helpful
reading by Dean H. Reese Hansen and his
associates. I am grateful to each of them
and show my gratitude by the obvious dis-
claimer: They are not responsible for what
I have done with the material and sugges-
tions they provided me.
In preparing for these remarks, I
reread what I said over 20 years ago at the
dedication of the building that houses the
J. Reuben Clark Law School. I used that
occasion to add what I called “one addi-
tional charge” to the formal charges given
to the Law School at the ceremony com-
memorating its opening two years earlier.
This additional charge concerned what I
called “the J. Reuben Clark Law School’s
special challenges and opportunities for
leadership in teaching ethics, morality, 
and professional responsibility” (“Ethics,
Morality and Professional Responsibility,”
Proceedings at the Convocation and
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University, Sept. 5,
1975, pp. 27–28).
I approached this subject from the
standpoint of what I called “the deeper
values from which we obtain our commit-
ments to law, morality, ethics, and profes-
sional responsibility” (ibid.). I asserted that
“the J. Reuben Clark Law School has the
most promising ideals and circumstances
to be a leader in this important area” (id.,
34–35). I presented my case for that asser-
tion in these words:
We have no difﬁdence in talking about
religious commitment at Brigham Young
University, and we will have none in the 
J. Reuben Clark Law School. Religious com-
mitment, religious values, and concern with
ethics and morality are part of the reason for
this school’s existence, and will be in the
atmosphere of its study. As President Marion
G. Romney . . . noted in our opening cere-
monies, this law school was established to pro-
vide an institution in which students could
“obtain a knowledge of the laws of man in the
light of the laws of God.” 
If it is true that law students cannot be
taught ethics and morality in law school
because those value commitments are ﬁxed
before they enroll, then that fact, an excuse
for other law schools, becomes a unique
opportunity for this one. Most of the students
and faculty at this law school are rooted in
the same religious tradition, and that tradi-
tion more than any other fact accounts for
their choosing this setting to pursue their pro-
fessional goals. The common ideals, princi-
ples, and commitments of that tradition
should make this institution superbly effec-
tive in strengthening the moral, ethical, and
professional foundations that compose the
ﬁnest heritage of our profession.
Because of our reliance on these com-
mon ideals, principles, and commitments,
the new building being dedicated today
should . . . be looked on as . . . a monument
to our determination that the fairness,
decency, integrity, virtue, and love of truth
taught at the hearthstones of thousands of
homes throughout the land shall have a con-
centrated impact on the legal profession and
the nation’s laws. It is in these homes, by
God-fearing parents, that the young men
and women who will be our graduates have
already gained that intangible moral instinct
that will bear its fruits in the legislative
halls, the courtrooms, the ofﬁces, and other
private and public places in the years to
come. [Id., 35–36]
As I look back on that occasion, I 
feel to reafﬁrm the substance of what I
said over 20 years ago, but I wish to use
different words to express it. The mean-
ings of words change with time, and so
does the emphasis we wish to give to var-
ious elements of our charge to excel 
in this vital area.
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My interest in doing
this is obvious.
My objective in these remarks is not
to discuss the details of the relationship
between personal morality and profes-
sional ethics or the application of either
morality or ethics in the multitude of
complex circumstances encountered in the
practice of law. The J. Reuben Clark Law
School has ample faculty resources for
that task, far beyond my experience and
abilities even to supplement. What I can
try to do is to view these forests from afar
and suggest some general limits or broad
distinctions to be made, within which our
sensitive experts will outline the princi-
ples, paint the appropriate patterns, and
ﬁll in the details.
The morality to which I referred in our
Law School dedication—morality based on
religious values, in our case—is the founda-
tion undergirding all of our conduct, per-
sonal and professional. Professional ethics
must be grounded upon our personal
moral foundation and, whatever its source,
should not be in conﬂict with it.
A moral foundation is, of course,
broader than the structure of professional
ethics that should be built upon it. Stated
otherwise, laws and rules other than pro-
fessional ethics are also built upon our
moral foundations. There are innumerable
examples of personal conduct that violate
commandments based on our religious/
moral foundations that are not prohibited
by the professional codes regulating the
conduct of lawyers. For Latter-day Saints,
these examples include such deviations 
as violating temple covenants, breaking 
the Sabbath, and viewing pornography.
Similarly, we look to commandments and
principles based on our moral founda-
tion—not to the rules of professional
responsibility—to regulate our relation-
ships with our spouses, our children, our
extended families, and our fellowmen. Our
personal moral foundation is also the
source that regulates our relationships with
the various organizations—religious, chari-
table, and community—through which we
render the service obligations imposed
upon us by those foundation principles.  
I was sensitized to the importance of
distinguishing between what I have called
the “moral foundation” and the profes-
sional ethics “structure” by my recent
reading of something written almost 25
years ago by Professor John J. Flynn, now
Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law at the
University of Utah College of Law. His
commentary, written in the 1970s fol-
lowing issuance of the aba’s Code of
Professional Responsibility, was titled
“Professional Ethics and the Lawyer’s
Duty to Self” (Washington University Law
Quarterly, 1976:429–436).
Flynn’s thesis was that “although
much attention has been paid to immoral
conduct and the means to prevent it, the
greater hazard to lawyers generally is that
of amoral conduct” (id., 29). He explains:
The conventional distinction between
amorality and immorality is particularly
cogent for the lawyer. Amoral conduct implies
that the actor has no standard of right and
wrong by which to judge conduct. . . . Immoral
conduct, on the other hand, implies that the
actor is aware of moral standards but has con-
sciously chosen to violate them. [Id., 429–30]
For reasons having to do with the
lawyer’s role in the adversary system,
which I will not elaborate here, Flynn con-
cludes that “the legal profession, while no
more or less vulnerable to immorality than
others, seems to be in considerable danger
of a profound amorality” (id., 434).
That conclusion may or may not be
correct. Either way, what stimulated me
most were Professor Flynn’s comments
about the role of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in all of this. He begins:
The [C]ode assumes that universal ethical
responsibilities for lawyers are to be deﬁned in
terms of the lawyer’s duties to the profession, his
client, the courts, and society at large. [Id., 434]
The “fundamental difﬁculty of the
Code,” he maintains, is that while it
“begins on the correct path by deﬁning the
roles lawyers must play in a legal system . . .
it simply does not go far enough” (id.,
434–35). I quote:
The Code prescribes duties the lawyer
owes to others—to society, to his profession, to
his client—but says nothing of the lawyer’s duty
to self. The internal guidelines that must limit
one’s obedience to orders or external duties are
unmentioned and unexamined. [Id., 435–36]
So what? we might ask. Flynn explains:
[I]n failing to make the ethical limita-
tions of the Code more explicit, the Code
may, in fact, be counterproductive to devel-
oping and reinforcing an ethical profession of
the highest order. By ignoring the lawyer’s
relation to himself and instead of emphasiz-
ing only the lawyer’s relation to others and
the profession, the Code allows lawyers to
rationalize many forms of conduct which
would otherwise transgress their duties to self
and, consequently, widely held moral values.
The emphasis on duty to others leads natu-
rally and dangerously to the “hired-gun”
model for deciding ethical questions. The
rules that deﬁne immorality may reinforce
the dangers of amorality, and allow an attor-
ney to justify almost any conduct that pro-
motes the interests of the client. [Id., 436]
These words of Professor Flynn chal-
lenged me to think about the contrast
between a code that deﬁnes professional
“morality” on the one hand, and the
lawyer’s moral foundation that provides
the basis for his or her personal morality
(or amorality) on the other. Of course, we
who are trained as advocates can defend
the Code’s explicit decision to limit its
subject matter to professional responsibili-
ties. But we could also make a case for the
proposition that a code of professional
responsibility should not be entirely silent
about the existence of other responsibili-
ties. Its failure to put the professional
responsibilities it speciﬁes into the larger
context of public or personal morality
could be understood as implying that the
professional code is a comprehensive list
of all of the responsibilities of lawyers and
thus, as Flynn says, “allow an attorney to
justify almost any conduct that promotes
the interest of the client” (id., 436).
Professor Flynn’s writings on this sub-
ject are basically a voice from the 1970s.
Other voices have taken up the same cry
in the two decades since then. Writing in
the Catholic Lawyer, 32:337 (1989), Simon Y.
Balian, a member of St. John’s University’s
St. Thomas More Institute for Legal
Research, maintains that the legal profes-
sion’s “morally neutral” codiﬁed rules have
the effect of providing an “ethical code” to
govern professional actions, in contrast to
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the general moral framework that governs
a lawyer’s actions in his or her personal
life. Balian asserts that this dual system of
roles encourages members of the legal pro-
fession to “leave behind their common
moral framework and enclose themselves
[in their professional activities] in a world
which is at best amoral” (id., 337–38).
Balian calls this concept “dual moral-
ity” or “role-differentiated behavior” (id.,
3446). He concludes:
The concept of dual morality for
professionals suggests a false dichotomy
in the life of a person. . . . The idea of 
[a separate morality for the profes-
sional] role involves both self-decep-
tion and abdication from responsibility
and invites immoral conduct. . . .The
inevitable result of the dominance
which the principle of separate ethics
holds over the legal profession is perva-
sive moral failure. [Id., 353]
Here I pause to thank the
spouses of lawyers and other non-
lawyer guests whose patience must
have been tried by the past 10 min-
utes of talk about obscure concepts
that can only be of interest to
lawyers and not to all of them. In
appreciation for your patience, I
will now try to clarify the subject of
“dual morality” or conﬂict between
moral requirements and professional
ethics by giving an example from a
case decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
David Spaulding, a teenager, was
injured in an auto accident. His father
sued for the damages the defendant caused
to his minor son. The injured boy was
examined by his own doctor and also by
the defendant’s doctor. David’s doctor did
not ﬁnd anything unusual in the boy’s
chest, but the defendant’s doctor advised
the defendant’s lawyer that David now
had an aneurysm in his aorta, which could
rupture at any time and cause his death.
The lawyers for the defendant realized
that neither David nor his father nor their
lawyers were aware of David’s aneurysm
and the lethal threat it posed if not cor-
rected. Common morality would seem to
require notiﬁcation of this danger, but the
defendant’s lawyer thought professional
ethics forbade notifying the adversary.
Defense counsel proceeded to settle the
case (for a relatively insigniﬁcant sum) and
neither before nor after the settlement
advised David or his father or their lawyer
of the threat to David’s life. There is your
example of conﬂict between morality and
professional ethics. Fortunately, a trial
judge later vacated the settlement agree-
ment on the basis that the defense lawyer’s
failure to make full disclosure to the court
when the parties applied for approval of a
settlement in the case of a minor fell short
of the lawyer’s obligation as an ofﬁcer 
of the court. The Minnesota Supreme
Court unanimously afﬁrmed. (Spaulding v.
Zimmerman, 116 n.w. 2d 704, Minn., 1962.)
This homely example from a routine
damage case illustrates one of the public’s
grievances against the legal profession. If a
lawyer fails to take an action the public con-
siders required by common morality and
then uses legal rules or lawyer ethics to jus-
tify his failure, this alienates the public from
lawyers. Citizens in this country do not like
to be told that some special group has
exclusive rules that excuse them from the
civilized conduct that is expected of others.
The potential conﬂict between per-
sonal morality and professional ethics 
continued to be debated in the 1990s. My
ﬁrst example is from Professor Joseph
Allegretti of Creighton University Law
School. His book The Lawyer’s Calling
(Mahwa, NJ: Paulist Press, 1996) praises Sir
Thomas More as “an authentic Christian
hero” (id., 118) and decries lawyers “whose
sense of moral obligation comes not from
themselves and their conscience but from
what others tell them—their profession,
their client, their codes of conduct”
(id., 119). Allegretti explains:
One of the great temptations for
lawyers is to see ourselves in the third
person, as the mere instrument of our
client. If we do so, of course, moral
issues disappear because we compart-
mentalize our lives and relegate our
moral and religious values to the pri-
vate realm of family and friends.
There is never any risk of having to
say “no” to a client or the system
because only a moral agent, an I, can
stand for something—a lawyer in the
third person has nothing to stand up
for or against.
We see in Thomas More someone
who was willing to be an I, to see him-
self in the ﬁrst person. More knew that
what he said and did mattered, that his
soul was implicated in his work. While
the precise issue—the taking of an
oath—may seem quaint and far-fetched
to us, the larger question of what we
stand for and whom we owe allegiance
to is as contemporary as this morning’s deposi-
tion or opinion letter. [Id., 119]
As a second voice from the current
decade, I offer the words of our colleague
Marianne M. Jennings, professor of legal
and ethical studies at Arizona State
University’s College of Business. Her
recent article in the Wisconsin Law Review,
1996:1223, as you would expect, is a lively
and persuasive criticism of the way profes-
sional ethics can deaden our sense of per-
sonal morality. She declares:
What has occurred in the legal profession
is typical of any organization or society that
becomes addicted to codes or statements of
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Citizens
do not like to be told
that some special group
has exclusive rules that
excuse them from the
civilized conduct that
is expected of others.
positive law. Rules are made, interpreted and
modiﬁed on a regular basis to ﬁt situations
with complex nuances. Once the complexity
becomes overwhelming, the original purpose
of the rules is lost or ignored. 
Lawyers are practicing craft ethics. If the
code, rules, or an opinion sanction an activ-
ity, we separate our own consciences from 
the behavior, label the behavior ethical, and
march forward with the full conﬁdence of
Professor Harold Hill. [Id., 1226]
I don’t like to quote footnotes, but
Jenning’s footnote referenced to the men-
tion of Professor Harold Hill is irresistible:
You may remember that Professor Hill,
of The Music Man, was a graduate of the
Gary Indiana Conservatory of Music and
hornswoggled the entire town of River City,
Iowa, into supporting a marching band, its
uniforms, and its instruments. . . . Professor
Hill was a ﬂimﬂam man who couldn’t 
play a note. . . . [He] would have been a great
lawyer. The man committed fraud in the
inducement, but still captured a town’s heart
as well as that of Marian, the librarian. We
still had trouble in River City, but no one
ever realized it. [Ibid.]
A few pages later Jennings writes:
Slowly but surely, with this fatal combi-
nation of the newly deﬁned role of winning
for the advocate and reliance solely on writ-
ten rules to govern conduct and choices,
lawyers have shaped a profession governed by
rules and devoid of morality. If it ain’t writ-
ten down, it can and will be done. The motto
of the trial as a quest for the truth has become
a quest for a verdict. [Id., 1238]
Enlightened by the insights and advo-
cacy of Flynn, Balian, Allegretti, and
Jennings, I have reexamined some prior
ethical preachments I have given to the
students and alumni of the J. Reuben
Clark Law School. In doing so I have real-
ized that, whatever I have called it, what I
have talked about on almost every occa-
sion I have addressed this audience is the
personal moral foundation of lawyers. In
effect, I have said that whatever the con-
tent of professional ethics, and even if it is
silent on a subject, lawyers should be gov-
erned by their religious/moral foundation
in all of their professional activities.
In 1988 I spoke to a ﬁreside of students
and faculty of the Law School. I referred
to Cornell Dean Roger Crampton’s article
“The Ordinary Religion of the Law School
Classroom,” 29 J. Legal Educ. 247 (1978), in
which he discussed the value assumptions
in the law school classroom. As I look
back on the three value assumptions I
quoted on that occasion, I realize that
each one of them is illustrative of the the-
sis I pursue this evening—that our profes-
sional codes and rules are only a partial
list of the behavioral requirements that
must guide men and women in the prac-
tice of law.
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, I see
that Crampton’s questions clearly illustrate
that our professional conduct must be
based on a moral foundation drawn from
values larger than the legal profession but
of profound importance to it. Without
reliance on this moral foundation, a lawyer
can be ethical (or moral) in terms of
adherence to the narrow requirements of
professional ethics, but amoral in those
relationships and that conduct not regu-
lated by professional codes or rules.
Crampton’s list of the value assump-
tions of the law school classroom include
these three: (1) Under the “instrumental
approach to law and lawyering,” “the law
is nothing more than an instrument for
achieving” the goals of the client, and the
“lawyer need not be concerned with . . .
the value questions associated with them”
because the lawyer is simply “the skilled
craftsman who works out the means by
which predetermined goals are achieved.”
(2) The skepticism encouraged in legal
study “inclines the student toward con-
cluding that principles are meaningless
and values are relative.” (3) The steady diet
of borderline cases served up in the law
school classroom, with relatively little
attention to routine legal problems of easy
solution, encourages students “to general-
ize that there are no right answers, just
winning arguments.”
After quoting these questions, I asked:
“Does training in the law dull one’s sense of
justice or one’s moral and ethical sensibili-
ties? Does it matter what clients and causes
we serve with the skills that we have devel-
oped?” (“Bridges,” Clark Memorandum, Fall
1988, p. 13). Some who are present here this
evening will remember that I then used the
story of The Bridge over the River Kwai to
illustrate my concerns “for the fundamental
integrity of those who study and prac-
tice law” (id., 13). I concluded my summary
with these words:
I do not know of a better example of the
glories of a technical job well done—crafts-
manship in the face of enormous adversity—
and the hazards of ignoring whose cause you
are serving by your blind craftsmanship—
than this homely little adventure play. . . . All
of this has a lot to do with legal ethics. It has a
lot to do with morality. It has a lot to do with
what I hope is a suitable antidote for the wor-
thy but distorting concentration on crafts-
manship that is part of what Dean Crampton
called the “ordinary religion of the law school
classroom.” [Id., 14] 
I then quoted Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s
notable commencement address delivered
at Harvard University in June 1978. As I
have reread those words, I think they are
also an excellent illustration of the dif-
ference between the formal structure of
professional ethics and the important
underlying moral foundation.
Solzhenitsyn described our Western
society as wholly dependent upon laws. 
Any conﬂict is solved according to the
letter of the law and this is considered to be
the ultimate solution. If one is right from a
legal point of view, nothing more is required,
nobody may mention that one could still 
not be entirely right. . . . I have spent my life
under a communist regime and I will tell you
that a society without any objective legal scale
is a terrible one indeed. But a society with no
other scale but the legal one is not quite wor-
thy of man either. A society which is based on
the letter of the law and never reaches any
higher is taking very scarce advantage of the
high level of human possibilities (Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, “A World Split Apart,” com-
mencement address delivered at Harvard
University, June 8, 1978). [Id., 14–15]
Similarly, some of you may be familiar
with my book The Lord’s Way (1991). In the
chapter on litigation, I discussed the princi-
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ples that seem to me to govern whether a
Latter-day Saint or any other Christian
should participate in litigation as a client.
Those principles are obviously based on the
foundations of Christian morality, rather
than on the more technical and more per-
missive provisions on the same subject in
codiﬁcations of professional ethics.
I wish to share one more voice 
from the 1990s, that of Professor Maura
Strassberg, assistant professor of law at
Drake University, writing in the Iowa Law
Review (80 Iowa L. Rev. 901 [1995]). In her
criticism of what she calls the “modern
articulation of legal ethics as positive law,
in the form of governmentally approved
ethical rules” (id., 901), Strassberg draws
freely on philosophical writings and his-
torical allusions. As to the latter, she cites
three instances where morally repugnant
but legally required decisions were ren-
dered by well-meaning judges who
“viewed law and morality as analytically
distinct” (id., 901). Her three illustrations
are pre–Civil War u.s. decisions applying
the fugitive slave law, Nazi Germany, and
apartheid South Africa.
Strassberg also discusses the origin 
of legal professional ethics. She says that
during the 19th century the legal profes-
sion’s view of legal ethics was “inextricably
connected to morality” (id., 906). (That 
is the connection I am advocating a cen-
tury later.) In 1905 the American Bar
Association charged a committee of promi-
nent attorneys to frame a code of ethics. In
context it appears that this code of ethics
was intended to supplement the moral
standards that were previously the only
restraint on a lawyer’s professional con-
duct. The resulting Canons, adopted by the
aba in 1908, were not cast in the form of
legally enforceable rules.
Looking back from nearly a century
later, we see that the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the successor Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, as their
names suggest, have been written like
statutes to deﬁne the lawyer’s role and to
specify rules for the lawyer’s behavior. So
viewed, they constitute positive law in
their own right and have the potential to
preempt moral rules to the contrary. From
this I conclude that in less than a century
we have moved from the point where per-
sonal morality was not a sufﬁcient guide
for lawyers to a point where it may not be
a permissible one.
Thus far I have cited only those pro-
fessional voices who deplore so-called dual
morality. I have read that some lawyers try
to justify one moral standard for profes-
sional activities and another for the
lawyer’s personal life. I doubt that this
idea of dual morality is advocated or
defended as a matter of principle. Rather,
it seems to me to be a rationalization—
a seeming justiﬁcation for behavior con-
trary to common morality by persons who
either lack a moral foundation or choose
to ignore their moral foundation when it
interferes with their quest for power, pres-
tige, or pecuniary gain.
In my view, the difﬁcult issue for
lawyers is not whether professional con-
duct is governed by moral standards as
well as professional ethics. Clearly it is.
The real issue arises when our personal
religious/moral standards forbid conduct
that is required by professional rules or
by our employer or where our personal
standards require conduct that is forbid-
den by professional rules or by our
employer. In other words, the difﬁcult
issue arises when there is a clear conﬂict
between the foundation moral standard
and the professional rule or direction.
(Parenthetically, this is not an issue for
those who advocate dual morality. All
they ask is whether the conduct is profes-
sional and therefore governed by the pro-
fessional rule, or personal and therefore
governed by personal morality. The difﬁ-
cult conﬂict only occurs for those like 
us who believe that personal morality
should trump professional rules.)
Note also that the difﬁcult issue I have
described does not arise unless the conﬂict
between personal morality and profes-
sional ethics is clear. For example, where
professional ethics require particular con-
duct and moral standards are silent or
obscure on the subject, we have an easy
case. The same is true when personal
morality forbids particular behavior, and
the ethical rule is obscure.
A clear conﬂict raises the interesting
question of how the institutions that dis-
cipline lawyers will react to a conﬂict
between personal moral and legal ethics.
Strassberg treats this question, asking,
“How would a bar committee or state
supreme court respond to a clear, but
morally desirable, violation of the ethical
rules?” (id., 903). Happily, she observes:
An analysis of bar association advisory
opinion shows that adjudicators do ﬂex and
bend the [professional] rules in order to
accommodate moral concerns. Advisory opin-
ions on the conﬁdentiality of client suicide
threats and on information on child abuse
have avoided formalism. Instead, these opin-
ions reveal an unusually broad reading of
language or even an unexplained deviation
from the positive language of the rules alto-
gether. This non-formalistic approach may be
better understood as a moderation of the con-
temporary conversation of legal ethics into
positive law. [Id., 905]
I fervently hope that leniency will be
followed wherever morally committed
lawyers violate legal ethics in direct oppo-
sition to clear and compelling moral rules
to the contrary.
The prophet Micah seems to have
been commenting on a similar contrast
between formal roles and underlying
moral principles when he declared to
ancient Israel:
Wherewith shall I come before the Lord,
and bow myself before the high God? shall I
come before him with burnt offerings, with
calves of a year old? 
Will the Lord be pleased with thousands
of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil?
shall I give my ﬁrstborn for my transgression,
the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?
He hath shewed thee, O man, what is
good; and what doth the Lord require of thee,
but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk
humbly with thy God? [Micah 6:6–8]
I pray that such fundamental moral
principles will ever be your ultimate
guide in resolving all of the multitude of
moral/ethical questions that confront you
in your employment and practice of law.
Elder Dallin H. Oaks is a member of the
Quorum of the Twelve Apostles of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
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PARADISE
ˆ At home with sharks, Ryan Tibbitts and other Caldera team members relax in the waters of the South Pacific.
BI T T E R  FE BR U A R Y  W IN D S  A N D  IN C E S S A N T  P HON E  C A LLS  W E R E  H A LF  A  W O R LD  AWAY   S T A R T
by Joyce Janetski
FOUND
T W O  J R C L S  G R A D U A T E S  S U R V I V E  C A L D E R A V .  M I C R O S O F T
  A S  ST E V E  HILL  ( ’ 77 )  A N D  R YA N  TIBBI T TS  ( ’ 84 )  LO OK E D  O U T  AT  T H E  BRILLI A N T  HO RI ZON  F R OM  BO R A  BO R A .
20 Clark Memorandum
I T  W A S  N O  W O N D E R  T H A T  A  Y O U N G  N A V A L  O F F I C E R  S T A T I O N E D  T H E R E  I N  1 9 4 2  H A D  C A L L E D  T H I S  S P E C K  I N  T H E
S O U T H  P A C I F I C  “ T H E  M O S T  B E A U T I F U L  I S L A N D  I N  T H E  W O R L D , ”
T H E Y  T H O U G H T .  J A M E S  M I C H E N E R ’ S  P A R A D I S E  1 4 0  M I L E S  O F F
T A H I T I  W A S  T H E  P E R F E C T  A N T I T H E S I S  T O  T H E  P A S T  T H R E E - A N D - A -
H A L F  Y E A R S  O F  T H E  A T T O R N E Y S ’  L I V E S .  T H E  C A L M N E S S  A N D  N A T -
U R A L  B E A U T Y  O F  T H E  P O LY N E S I A N  R E T R E A T  C O N T R A S T E D  S H A R P LY
W I T H  T H E  G I G A N T I C  C A N N O N S  S U R R O U N D I N G ,  A N D  O N C E  G U A R D I N G ,
T H E  U . S .  A I R  B A S E  B U I LT  O N  T H E  I S L A N D  D U R I N G  W O R L D  W A R  I I .
S T E V E  C O N T E M P L A T E D  T H E  P O I S E D ,  U N F I R E D  G U N S  A N D  T H E  T E R R I -
B L E  B A T T L E S  F O U G H T  I N  T H E  P A C I F I C .  O C C A S I O N A L LY  S O L D I E R S
W E R E  S E N T  T O  B O R A  B O R A  T O  R E S T  A N D  R E C U P E R A T E  F R O M  T H E
F I G H T I N G .  A LT H O U G H  T H A T  I M M E N S E  C O N F L I C T  W A S  F O U G H T  B Y
A N  E A R L I E R  G E N E R A T I O N  A N D  E X A C T E D  T H E  H I G H E S T  P A Y M E N T ,
S T E V E  A N D  R Y A N  W E R E  V E T E R A N S  O F  A  N E W  K I N D  O F  C O M B A T :
T E C H O - W A R .  T H E  C O M P A N Y  T H E Y  R E P R E S E N T E D ,  C A L D E R A ,  I N C . ,
H A D  J U S T  S E T T L E D  A  M A J O R  L A W S U I T  A G A I N S T  M I C R O S O F T ,  T H E
B I G G E S T  O F  T H E  “ B I G  G U N S ”  O F  T H E  C O M P U T E R  W O R L D ,  A  S T R U G -
G L E  T H A T  H A D  L A S T E D  A L M O S T  A S  L O N G  A S  W O R L D  W A R  I I .  T O  C E L E -
B R A T E  O N E  O F  T H E  L A R G E S T  P R I V A T E  A N T I T R U S T  S E T T L E M E N T S  I N
H I S T O R Y,  T H E  E N T I R E  C A L D E R A  LE G A L  T E A M  H A D  G O N E  T O  TA H I T I  F O R
S O M E  R E S T  A N D  R E C U P E R AT I O N .  T H E Y  H A D  F I N A L LY  M A D E  I T  TO  B A LI  H A I .
Stephen J. Hill
t the law ofﬁces of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, in Salt Lake City,
Utah, a few weeks later, Steve Hill
talks about Bora Bora and the 
remnants of World War II on the island.
As he begins an interview with Clark
Memorandum, law partner Ryan Tibbitts
enters the conference room. For a few
moments the splendors of Tahiti pro-
vide a pleasant memory for the two J.
Reuben Clark Law School graduates who
are about to relate the battle that got
them there.
T R O U B L E  B R E W I N G
The road leading to the January 10, 2000,
settlement of a lawsuit brought by Caldera
against Microsoft ended just short of a
jury trial. Steve Hill and Ryan Tibbitts,
two of the dozen attorneys representing
Caldera, lived and breathed the case since
it was ﬁled in July 1996. It is a story worth
retelling.
The beginning of the rivalry was fair
enough: In 1981 Bill Gates began licensing
his ms-dos computer operating system to
ibm, beating out a rival operating system,
cp/m, created by Digital Research, Inc.
(dri). Though ms-dos traced its roots
back to cp/m, Gates took the lead,
retained licensing rights, and laid the
foundation of his fame and fortune: free
enterprise in the emerging computer
industry.
The battle against Microsoft began in
1988 when Digital Research released a new
rival to ms-dos called dr dos. Soon dr dos
began to receive praise as a superior alter-
native to Microsoft’s ms-dos software,
which then dominated the personal com-
puter market. In 1989 ms-dos still had 90
percent of the computer operating system
market. dr dos got a boost when Novell,
the world’s second-largest software com-
pany, bought dri in October 1991 for $125
million in stock. By 1992 dr dos brieﬂy
surpassed ms-dos in retail sales. However,
by March dr dos sales began to plummet.
By 1993 they were dead.
As early as 1989, Federal Trade
Commission attorneys were investigating
Microsoft. By fall 1993 the Department of
Justice got involved and eventually sued
Microsoft over its dos business practices.
Ray Noorda had his own plans.
For years, Noorda—the man who
brought Novell back from bankruptcy in
1983—had urged his board to sue Microsoft
for killing competition in the dos market
using illegal tactics. But not until he
retired from Novell in 1994 and formed a
company named Caldera was Noorda able
to make his move. In July 1996 Caldera
bought dr dos from Novell for $400,000
and the same day ﬁled suit against
Microsoft.
Noorda’s small company accused the
software giant of leading computer users
to believe that dr dos would not work
with Microsoft’s Windows by writing
code that caused error messages to appear
when Windows ran on top of dr dos. The
lawsuit also alleged that Microsoft made
illegal licensing deals with computer man-
ufacturers who installed its software in
the computers they sold, that it deliber-
ately announced overly optimistic release
dates for its products to beat out the com-
petition, and that it illegally tied together
two products, ms-dos and Windows, to
create Windows 95.
By July 1996 Steve Hill and Ryan
Tibbitts had entered the picture.
R E C R U I T M E N T
“The statute of limitations set a deadline
for us,” says Steve, as he leans forward 
to emphasize his words. “In 1994 [the
Department of] Justice had ﬁled essentially
the same case we did and then settled in
August of ’95 with Microsoft. So we had
until mid-August of 1996 to ﬁle our case.”
The “we” included litigators hired that
summer by Ray Noorda and Caldera pres-
ident Bryan Sparks: Ralph Palumbo, from
Seattle, Stephen Susman, a Houston attor-
ney, and the strong legal team they gath-
ered around them. They had taken the
Caldera case on a contingency basis.
Reﬂecting on his early involvement
with the Caldera lawsuit, Steve recalls, “If I
was really going to pick a date when the
seeds were planted, it was just before my
10-year law school reunion in 1987.” He
recounts that one of the former classmates
he was asked to call to donate money to
the Law School was David Bradford, who
is general counsel for Novell.
“As a result of that contact, I started
doing a little bit of Novell work that grew
over time,” he says. “In early ’93 David 
told me that the ftc was investigating
Microsoft. They and Novell were seriously
considering a civil case at that point. I ﬁlled
him in on my antitrust background, which
started in Seattle. I practiced there for four
years, doing mainly antitrust work, and I
made friends with a lot of good antitrust
lawyers and even knew people that worked
in Microsoft’s Seattle law ﬁrm.”
Steve expounds: “I studied economics
as an undergraduate at byu. I always had
an interest in antitrust. When I started
working with Novell and I learned about
the industry, this particular issue became
one of extreme interest to me. It’s just
funny how the threads of your life weave
together. It seems like everything that I’ve
done from my undergraduate background
to the Law School association to the
acquaintances I made in Seattle all came
together to create the opportunity.”
“In 1995 we had actually been involved
representing Novell and had some real live,
ongoing antitrust experience in a monopo-
lization case,” he explains. “Obviously, it
was pretty important.”
Steve continues to tell how in early
1996, when he was in Germany, he got a
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call from Novell wanting an assessment
of what he thought of the case, because
the company was thinking of selling the
dr dos business. “A couple of months
went by—I thought the case was just
going to die. Then later in the spring, I
got a call from Dave Bradford. . . . I con-
tacted a friend of mine named Ralph
Palumbo. . . . That led to a meeting at
Novell between me, Ralph Palumbo, and
Steve Susman of Susman Godfrey. . . .
Bradford was convinced that we had 
a good legal team. But Novell was in 
the process of selling the business to
Caldera, a company chieﬂy owned by
Ray Noorda. At that point, Ryan came
into the picture.”
Ryan jumps into the interview,
explaining how Steve told him that Novell
was going to sell the dr dos business to
Ray Noorda. “As it turned out,” Ryan
says, “a friend of mine named Ralph Yarro
is Ray Noorda’s right-hand man. . . . So I
called Ralph and brought him up to speed
on what Steve had been doing with the
claim with Novell, shepherding it through
the ftc and the doj. . . . [By] July of 1996,
we had the complaint ﬁled.”
Digressing from the story for a
moment, Ryan talks about how he came
to be involved in Caldera v. Microsoft.
“Unlike Steve,” he says, “nothing in my
life prepared me for the case. . . . Rex Lee
was my stake president at byu. He was a
big byu football fan, and I was on the team
down there. I’d occasionally run with him
after football practice. He really twisted
my arm to go to law school. The only way
I could justify going to law school in 
my mind was saying, ‘Okay. I’ll go and
become a sports agent.’” But after meeting
some sports agents, Ryan changed his
mind. He graduated from the J. Reuben
Clark Law School in 1984 and ended up at
Snow, Christensen & Martineau. “Working
in a large law ﬁrm on antitrust cases is the
last thing I thought I would be doing,” he
says. Although Ryan chose not to become
a sports agent, photographs on a wall of
his ofﬁce suggest that he does represent 
at least one professional athlete—former
teammate Steve Young.
Although he entered the case in July
1996, Ryan became more involved by the
spring of 1997. The legal team he joined
had grown to 12 main lawyers, plus three
or four associates from each of the three
main law ﬁrms—Susman Godfrey; Summit
Law Group; and Snow, Christensen &
Martineau.
O V E R S E A S  O P E R A T I O N S
The Caldera v. Microsoft case took its
lawyers beyond the valleys of Utah and
shores of Seattle chasing evidence in
Europe and Asia. Two countries that
played key roles in the lawsuit were areas
where, coincidentally, Steve and Ryan had
served Church missions: Germany and
Korea. The language skills they developed
and the contacts they made during those
two-year periods put them at a distinct
advantage as they returned to those lands
on a different type of mission.
“Steve served a mission in Germany. I
served a mission in South Korea,” Ryan
says. “As it turned out, those two coun-
tries both had big parts of the story [sur-
rounding] our case. There were quite a
few trips abroad. I spent more time going
to Asia, and Steve went to Germany quite
a few times.”
“dr dos programmers were actually
based in England,” explains Steve. “At that
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time the biggest pc manufacturer in Europe
was Vobis, based in Aachen, Germany.
Vobis was the biggest account that [dr dos]
had ever had. In 1989 and 1990 Vobis was a
100-percent dr dos shop; they didn’t use
any Microsoft operating systems.
“So it was a huge deal to Microsoft to
get the Vobis account,” Steve emphasizes.
“More importantly, they were concerned
that if other oem’s in Europe had seen
Vobis’ success, they would go to dr dos
rather than ms-dos. So it became a big deal
to Microsoft to win the Vobis account,
which they ultimately did. Digging out
that story took a lot of time and was a
fairly signiﬁcant piece of the story we
would have told at trial.”
“Well, that’s a whole other unbelievable
episode,” Steve continues. “We eventually
managed to talk to the ceo of Vobis. . . .
While in England we made contact with
one of the top guys at Vobis through one of
the salespeople at Novell Duesseldorf. The
Vobis guy wouldn’t talk to us on the phone,
but said he would meet us the next day in
Aachen. I felt like I was in a spy novel. . . .
We made good friends with him, and then
he gave us the contact information for the
ceo of Vobis, Theo Lieven. We sent [Lieven]
several e-mails and called and called.
Finally, he agreed to see us. He owns a
chateau just across the border in Belgium.”
Steve and others convinced Lieven to
sit for a deposition in Los Angeles, which,
he says, “turned out to be pretty impor-
tant evidence for us.”
Explaining why Korea was important
in the Caldera case, Ryan says, “When
Digital Research launched their competing
operating system—dr dos—part of their
strategy was to go places that weren’t very
important to Microsoft, that were kind 
of off the Microsoft radar screen. So 
they started going to small oem accounts
in Asia, including Korea and Taiwan. They
opened their ﬁrst ofﬁce in Taiwan and
their second ofﬁce in Korea.
“Microsoft viewed Korea as a beach-
head where dr dos might make some gain
into their market,” he continues. “So they
really unloaded on dr dos in Korea, 
and ultimately the Korean government
reviewed some of Microsoft’s activities
there. That was a story we were able to
develop from people I met over there. . . . I
was also able to surprise a Microsoft lawyer
in a deposition of a Korean witness when
he learned that I could understand what the
witness and the interpreter were saying.”
I N  T H E  T R E N C H E S
Ryan explained that “in a typical large
commercial case, you’re going to win or
lose your case on your witnesses and your
documents, because you get very little
from the other side.” Consequently, as
lawyers for the underdog, Ryan, Steve, and
their colleagues had to scrutinize seem-
ingly endless leads to come up with some
ammunition.
“Every witness we got was a ‘romance,’”
Steve says. “We had to go ﬁnd them, and
they were scattered all over the world. Then
once we found them, we had to make
friends with them and convince them that
our cause was just, that we had a chance of
succeeding, and we were good guys.”
“And that it was worth it for them to
donate all kinds of time getting ready for
depositions,” Ryan breaks in.
“Everybody worried what would be
the consequence to them personally if
they testiﬁed, . . . what it would mean pro-
fessionally if they went public,” Steve says.
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Other kinds of evidence were not
much easier to discover, but did yield
rewards. “The judge ordered Microsoft to
turn over all of their memos and e-mails,”
Ryan relates. “We spent literally weeks in
Seattle going through boxes of documents.
We found some amazing smoking guns in
there. Many of the Microsoft documents
were so good for us it almost made our
client’s documents unimportant.” 
Steve says, “We felt like, ‘Wow, our
case is every bit as good as we had hoped.
In fact, better really than we thought it
would turn out to be, once we saw their
documents.’”
In more ways than one, e-mail turned
out to be the salvation of the Caldera
attorneys. Not only was it their most
effective form of communication as they
investigated the case, but, ironically, e-mail
provided them with their best evidence.
Retrieved Microsoft e-mails veriﬁed what
Caldera was trying to prove: that the
Microsoft tactics Caldera complained
about were designed to undermine dr dos
and further monopolize the market.
T H E  D A R K E S T  H O U R S
The three-and-a-half-year pursuit of
Microsoft proved to be a bumpy ride for
the Caldera attorneys, sometimes with
little light at the end of the tunnel. When
asked if they were discouraged during the
experience, Steve and Ryan didn’t hesitate
to respond.
“The dri people were very self-critical
because they knew they weren’t getting
sales like they should have,” says Ryan. “dr
dos was winning awards, but they couldn’t
make the sales. They didn’t know what
Microsoft was doing behind the scenes
then. So there were all of these bad memos
about dri and its people. And that’s what I
got hit with in depositions. . . . I remember
the plane ride home from the ﬁrst one; I
was pretty dejected and thinking, ‘Boy,
we’ve got some problems here.’ . . . I think
that was my low point. But, because of
what we found in Microsoft memos and e-
mail, we found a way to deal with it.”
“Just the process of being opposed to
somebody so powerful caused us prob-
lems,” says Steve. “Gathering witnesses was
a much more difﬁcult and unusual process
than I had ever been through before.”
Sometimes the diversity of expecta-
tions within the legal team created chal-
lenges. “You can imagine,” Ryan says,
“with three different law ﬁrms and 15 dif-
ferent lawyers involved, there were many
different views as to whether we ought to
settle or go to trial, or if we do settle,
what the value of the case is.”
“But all of that ﬁnally turned out ﬁne,”
Steve stresses. “I’d say that working with
these other two ﬁrms, you would have
thought there would have been prima don-
nas and ego plays. I would say that never
happened. What tended to happen, believe
it or not, was there was so much to do and
people had different talents and experi-
ences, that the lawyers seemed to self-
select the things that they could do the
best. We had very few issues about who
should do what. We were really in accord
throughout the whole process.”
C O U N T E R A T T A C K S  A N D  S E T T L E M E N T
“It was real hardball litigation,” Steve
admits. “I’ll bet Microsoft ﬁled dozens of
motions on various issues. And of all of
those, we could only count a handful that
they won. But it’s amazing that with all of
that, the relations between counsel were
actually really quite good, very professional
and cordial.”
“They just wanted to keep us dis-
tracted,” Ryan adds. “They clearly wanted
to get rid of the case. We were at the right
place at the right time in a lot of respects,
because they were dealing with what was
going on in Washington, d.c., and they
didn’t want to be going through our trial
at the time that Judge [Thomas Penﬁeld]
Jackson was trying to ﬁgure out what to
do with them back there.”
Although the case against Microsoft
did not go to trial, the settlement was a
substantial win for Caldera and its attor-
neys. (Analysts contend that the evi-
dence that would have been revealed in
court promised to hurt Microsoft even
more than any monetary ﬁne.) The
lawyers cannot disclose the settlement 
ﬁgure because of a conﬁdentiality agree-
ment; however, the Salt Lake Tribune
reported the settlement at $250 mil-
lion (“Caldera, Microsoft Settle for 
$250m,” Salt Lake Tribune, 11 January
2000), whereas the Wall Street Journal
reported it at $275 million (“Microsoft to
Settle Suit by Caldera,” Wall Street Journal,
11 January 2000).
Thus, the trip to Tahiti.
N O T  W I T H O U T  C O S T
As in any battle, many kinds of sacriﬁce
were made during the long course of
Caldera’s investigation of Microsoft’s prac-
tices. During the time they were involved
in the lawsuit, Ryan and Steve and their
families felt the force of this commitment.
“I traveled a lot,” begins Ryan. “I went
to Europe two or three times and Asia
two or three times. . . . There were literally
times when I had to have my wife, Nan,
meet me at the airport just long enough to
grab a different suitcase of stuff and head
off somewhere else. But the way I dealt
with it, I let other things slip in my life
rather than not spend time with my wife
or my kids. . . . It was something we talked
about, but it didn’t cause major problems.” 
Steve confesses, “For the most part I
was having the time of my life. But while I
was having this experience, my wife, Tauni,
and my kids were at home dealing with my
absence. There were periods where I was
pretty distracted, and they had to deal with
my emotional ups and downs as well.”
When asked if his children, who range
between nine and 21 years of age, are inter-
ested in going into law, Steve responds,
“No, but they’re interested in technology.
In fact, all of them are involved with it in
one fashion or another.”
Ryan, whose ﬁve children are 10 and
under, comments, “At least my two oldest
kids were interested in the case. A few
times my name made it into the paper with
quotes, and that was cool for the kids to
talk about with their teachers at school.”
He continues, “Our last two boys were
born during the course of this case. I
remember with the ﬁrst one, one of the
things that I did in order to spend more
time with the family would be to go home
at 6:00 at night and take two or three boxes
of documents that I needed to review to
prep for these depositions I was defending.
I can remember quite a few nights with
that baby when he would wake up at 2:00
in the morning for feedings, sitting out on
the couch holding him and going through
documents while I was up.”
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Steve takes his turn: “I guess I turned
into kind of a cell phone addict. At one
point my family was complaining that
when I was home, I was on the ‘dang’ tele-
phone. . . . I came to the realization that
once I was home, I had to be home, and I
wouldn’t take or make calls.”
Calculating that he spent two-thirds to
three-fourths of his legal time involved in
the case, Steve notes, “The last year, it was
most of the time. . . . We [the legal team]
spent so much time together, we may have
seen more of members of the trial team
than we did of our own spouses over the
past three-and-a-half years.” Ryan puts his
commitment at 60 to 70 percent of his time.
In addition to their time away from
their families, both attorneys were worried
about the length of time they were devot-
ing to a contingency case. “It was very
risky,” Ryan admits. “I know both of us
lost a lot of sleep—many people in our
ﬁrm were very supportive, but, as you can
imagine, and justiﬁably so, there were
some people that were pretty skeptical
because we were spending up to three-
quarters of our time [on the case], which
meant we were not bringing in any money
for the ﬁrm. They were wondering what
we were really contributing to the mix. . . .
But the settlement healed all of those
wounds,” Ryan laughs.
Steve conﬁdes, “There was a lot of
pressure. . . . I was concerned about what
my partners here were thinking and the
fact that they were paying us to be off
doing this while they were doing things
that actually brought in money. . . . Those
kinds of considerations made [the case for
us] less exciting.”
G A I N S
Of course the magnitude of Caldera’s
claim against Microsoft made the case
very exciting. And the fact that Caldera
eventually obtained a large settlement
made the pursuit all the better. But, as
Steve recently expressed in an e-mail to
his case colleagues, “While the money is
wonderful, this case certainly was not
entirely about money.”
Reﬂecting on his personal feelings
about the experience, Steve says, “For me
as a lawyer in private practice, I couldn’t
imagine anything that would be more
important, because I always saw this case
as a signiﬁcant case for the industry. I
always felt like we were doing something
that really needed to be done. . . . I decided
you just couldn’t worry about failure.”
Perhaps the greatest result of the case,
Steve says, was the effect it had on the
computer industry. “We made some his-
tory. . . . [Caldera] deserves a lot of praise
for having the courage and conviction to
undertake the case. They did what many in
the industry have talked about but never
attempted before we ﬁled [the lawsuit].”
The adventures they had and the
friends they made also made their involve-
ment a rich experience. “A great aspect of
the case,” Ryan says, “is that we worked
with and we went up against some of the
greatest lawyers in the country. . . . Susman
Godfrey is known as one of the top com-
mercial litigation ﬁrms in the country. The
main Susman Godfrey lawyers—Susman,
Parker Folse, and Charles Eskridge—all
clerked at the u.s. Supreme Court. The
Summit Law Group lawyers were also out-
standing. One of them, Matt Harris, knew
the technology better than Microsoft.”
“A big part of the job is dealing with
the press all the way through,” says Steve.
“I was on a friendly basis with one of the
lead reporters for the Wall Street Journal,
and never in my experience had I had any-
thing like that happen.”
As for their experience “being a little
bit like a spy novel,” Ryan says, “I would
know there would be a big deposition of a
Microsoft witness going on in Seattle at
the same time I was in California defend-
ing somebody else. . . . It was fun to check
the e-mail. Somebody would report, ‘Oh,
this deposition was awesome. This witness
said, “a, b, c, and d.” And we really nailed
him with this document.’ Or you would
call people at the various law ﬁrms to ﬁnd
out what intrigue was going on with them
at the time. That made it exciting.”
When asked the obvious question,
Ryan answers, “I met Bill [Gates] at his
deposition in October of ’97. We spent
two days out at the Microsoft headquar-
ters in Redmond taking his deposition.”
T H E  F A B R I C  O F  L I F E
One of the aspects of Steve’s and Ryan’s
experience with Caldera v. Microsoft was
the reality of life outside of the case. Many
things happened during the three-and-a-
half years besides the lawsuit.
“It was so all-encompassing that it
seemed like we all lived through these
shared experiences that were real life that
were going on while we were totally
engaged in a lawsuit,” Steve conveys.
“Collectively, we experienced births,
deaths, illnesses, marriages, divorces, and
a few lawyers coming and going. In doing
so, we formed deep friendships. . . . We
pretty much saw the entire fabric of life.” 
“One of the things that came of this
was . . . I developed a real interest in going
and trying to do something outside of the
law ﬁrm,” he says. As Steve leaves Snow,
Christensen & Martineau to work as vice
president of business development at Alta
Technology Corporation in Sandy, Utah,
Ryan buckles down to his role of president
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
Bora Bora, with its pristine beaches
and silent guns, is now only a pleasant
memory for the Caldera lawyers. Although
they have moved on to other cases or new
careers, none of them will soon forget the
four-year journey that took them to this
paradise in the South Paciﬁc.
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book review: Joseph G. Allegretti. 
The Lawyer’s Calling: Christian Faith and Legal Practice. 
New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1996.

oseph G. Allegretti’s book The Lawyer’s
Calling is an accessible, thoughtful, challeng-
ing defense of the view that it is possible to
be both a lawyer and a Christian. Picking up
a theme sounded by Yale Law School Dean
Anthony Kronman in his book The Lost
Lawyer, Allegretti maintains, “At its core 
the legal profession faces not so much a crisis 
of ethics or commercialization, or public
relations, but a spiritual crisis. Lawyers and
the profession have lost their way” (pg. 3).
Whereas Kronman looked to the his-
toric ideals of the legal profession and the
Aristotelean concept of practical wisdom
in search of an anecdote for the “crisis of
morale” in the legal profession, Allegretti
looks to Christianity as a way of trans-
forming our legal culture inwardly, one
lawyer at a time, by identifying and
applying “resources in the Christian tradi-
tion that can help lawyers reconnect their
work with their deepest and most pro-
found values” (pg. 5).
It is a formidable project, and it is a
tribute to Allegretti, a professor of legal
ethics at Creighton University Law School,
that he undertakes it. The author recounts
an anecdote about a friend who, upon
hearing that he was writing a book about
what it means to be a Christian and a
lawyer, replied, “But Joe, what will you do
with the rest of the page?” (pg. 1). The
remarkable thing is not that Allegretti did
ﬁnd enough to ﬁll an entire page, but that
he manages to pack a very wide discussion
of many facets of legal practice into a brief
and readable 125 pages.
The Basic Typology
Allegretti uses as a point of departure
Richard Niebuhr’s effort in his monu-
mental book Christ and Culture to identify
and evaluate a number of approaches that
Christians have taken toward the wider
secular culture. In applying Niebuhr’s
typology to the legal profession, Allegretti
begins by identifying the “standard vision”
of the lawyer’s role in American culture.
The standard vision, which
Allegretti calls the “Code,” is dominated
by two values, neutrality and partisan-
ship. The lawyer “is neutral, in that
he does not let his personal values
affect his actions for clients; and he
is partisan, in that he does whatever
he can to achieve his client’s objec-
tives, whatever they might be,
limited only by the law itself”
(pg. 9). According to the standard
vision, “a lawyer’s primary respon-
sibility is to represent his client
to the best of his ability and
leave questions of ‘truth’ and
‘justice’ to others” (pg. 8). Rather
than letting his own moral scruples
intrude on his work, the lawyer
acts as the “proverbial hired gun,”
constrained only by what is legal
(pgs. 8–9). Accordingly, “[a] trial is
seen almost as a sporting event, where the
two lawyers face off against each other,
while a neutral umpire or referee (the
judge and jury) enforces the rules to
ensure that neither party obtains an unfair
advantage” (pg. 9).
Adapting Niebuhr’s analysis of vari-
ous attitudes a Christian can adopt
towards secular culture, Allegretti dis-
cusses four contrasting approaches that a
Christian lawyer might take in response
to the standard vision of the lawyer’s role.
Allegretti explains that each of these
models represents an ideal type, and as
individuals we may ﬁnd ourselves exhibit-
ing different aspects of more than one of
these responses. 
The ﬁrst model Allegretti calls “Christ
Against Culture.” According to this view it
is simply not possible to be a Christian
and a lawyer. An example of this approach
is a former lawyer Allegretti met at Yale
Divinity School, who had abandoned the
law because she found that what she did
as a lawyer was incompatible with her
Christian faith. Adherents of the Model
One believe that lawyers “inevitably do
things for clients that no true follower of
Christ could countenance. Between Christ
and the Code is a chasm so wide and so
deep that it can never be bridged” (pg. 11).
If this model is correct, a Christian lawyer
is faced with a choice of either abandoning
one’s professional life or abandoning one’s
commitment to living as a Christian.
A second approach, a mirror image of
the ﬁrst, is “Christ in Harmony with the
Code.” According to Model Two, there is
no perceived tension between the gospel
and the Code. Allegretti notes that lawyers
who adopt this model are often surprised
and even a bit insulted by the question 
of whether it is hard to be a Christian and
a lawyer (pg. 14). Model Two, which
Allegretti seems to believe is the dominant
attitude of most lawyers, has certain bene-
ﬁts. It frees lawyers from self-doubt and
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THE F IRST MODEL 
ALLEGRETT I  CALLS “CHRIST
AGAINST CULTURE.”
introspection, enabling them to focus
entirely upon their duty to their clients.
But there are signiﬁcant problems with
this attitude as well. For one thing, it tends
to “blunt the radical message of the gospel
and domesticate its countercultural thrust”
(pg. 15). More troubling, it enables the
lawyer to view himself, in the words of
Richard Wasserstrom, as an “amoral tech-
nician” (pg. 16). A lawyer in the grip of this
approach also fails to see that “God may
call us to something more or different than
the Code” (pg. 16).
Allegretti’s third model is “Christ in
Tension with the Code.” According to this
dualist vision, “Christians inhabit two
worlds, a private realm in which they
relate to God as individuals and are bound
by the teachings and example of Christ,
and a public sphere where they live and
work and must make accommodations to
the sinfulness of the human condition”
(pg. 17). According to Model Three, there
is no way to bring the two realms of
Christ and the Code together. Life is com-
partmentalized, and the two spheres of life
are separated. At home, the lawyer “tries
to live out his Christian values, but when
at work he looks to the Code” (pg. 18).
In response to questions such as “How
could you represent such a client?” or
“How could you do that on behalf of a
client?” the compartmentalizing dualist
will respond, “I was only doing my job”
(pg. 18). This approach is ultimately dis-
satisfying, Allegretti argues, because 
while honest about moral ambiguities, it
results in a kind of moral schizophrenia.
Allegretti recalls the response of a lawyer
friend he complimented for donating time
and talents to church service on Sunday.
“I’ve got to do something on the weekend
to make up for what I do the rest of the
week,” the friend explained wearily (pg. 1).
Model Three dualists “forget a simple
yet profound truth of the Christian mes-
sage: God is the God of all of life, and so
God’s claim is on us always and every-
where” (pg. 19). Allegretti also notes that 
a schizophrenic life is inherently unstable.
“Something has to give, and it comes as 
no surprise that if a lawyer takes positions
at odds with his personal values, over 
time those values will change to comport
with his public behavior” (pg. 19). Model 
Three slides slowly and imperceptibly into
Model Two.
The fourth model Allegretti calls
“Christ Transforming the Code.” Model
Four “asserts that Christ is the Lord of all,
even the legal profession, and that
Christians are called to serve Christ in all
of life, even their life as professionals” (pg.
21). Model Four asks the lawyer to seek to
live an integrated life, “to bring his reli-
gious values into the workplace, with the
hope and trust that God will work
through him to revitalize and transform
his life as a lawyer, his profession, and ulti-
mately the wider community as well.”
Allegretti concedes that while we might
feel an attraction to Model Four, it is difﬁ-
cult to know what it means for us in every-
day life. He remembers a divinity school
professor who, in response to Niebuhr’s
typology noted, “Everyone wants to be a
transformationist, but nobody is quite sure
what it means!” (pg. 21).
Living the Transformationist Ideal
Allegretti spends the rest of the book
trying to explain what it
might mean to try to inte-
grate one’s life as a Christian
with the secular culture’s
vision of the Code. In succes-
sive chapters Allegretti focuses
upon what it means to be part of a
“profession” and to have a religious
“vocation” or “calling” (chapter 2),
the idea of the lawyer-client relation-
ship as one characterized not simply
by “contract” but by “covenant”
(chapter 3), and the “prophetic
ministry” of the lawyer who can
be a voice calling her clients back
to their better selves (chapter 4). 
The book then takes an
extended look at the lawyer’s
role in litigation, urging a move
from the paradigm of the lawyer as
“hired gun” to that of the lawyer as
“healer” (chapter 5), applying
Christian teaching regarding “just
war” to litigation (chapter 6), and
advocating the adoption of an “ethic of
care” to complement law’s dominant focus
on an “ethic of rights” (chapter 7). In the
ﬁnal chapter, Allegretti contrasts two
lawyers from literature, Leo Tolstoy’s Ivan
Ilyich, who is a paradigmatic Model Two
“amoral technician,” and Robert Bolt’s
Thomas Moore, who illustrates the Model
Four integrationist ideal.
Each of these chapters provides rich
food for thought, and each contains con-
crete bits of helpful advice for the lawyer
seeking to integrate her professional life
with her religious commitments. Especially
for a lawyer feeling dissatisﬁed with her
professional life, the book contains a num-
ber of insights and suggestions that might
enable lawyers to better integrate their pro-
fessional work with their moral ideals.
For example, Allegretti stresses the
importance of lawyers treating their clients
as whole persons deserving of respect,
sympathy, and counsel, rather than just a
case to be won or settled, or a transaction
to be completed. I suspect that by follow-
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ing this simple suggestion, which is surpris-
ingly difﬁcult in the hectic workday of the
average lawyer, many lawyers could signiﬁ-
cantly increase the level of satisfaction they
get from their professional life. 
In the interest of time and space, I will
focus my attention on Allegretti’s analysis
of the lawyer’s “calling” or “vocation” and
the implications of lawyers seeking to cul-
tivate an “ethic of care.”
The Lawyer’s Calling
Medieval theologians such as St.
Thomas Aquinas taught that the highest
human activity was contemplation of God.
In contrast, “normal secular work had no
real signiﬁcance, and was thought to be a
hindrance to the religious life, for it dis-
tracted one from the leisure that was nec-
essary for divine contemplation” (pg. 27).
This view changed with the Reformation.
“Luther and Calvin reacted to the
medieval devaluation of everyday work by
attacking the notion that one could live
the Christian life only by abandoning the
secular world for the monastery” (pg. 27).
Charles Kammer summarizes Luther’s
thought as follows: “Any occupation
becomes a ‘calling’ if its primary motive is
serving God, responding to God’s wishes
and intentions for human existence” (pg.
27). Thus, after the Reformation, while it is
no longer necessary to join the monastery
to serve God, “no Christian is exempt
from the duty to follow Christ and to
serve the neighbor in love” (pg. 28).
Any job, including that of a lawyer,
may be a “calling” if our attitude and dis-
position make it one. The professions—
until recently a concept that included
only the ministry, medicine, and the law—
have a “natural propensity” to be a calling
because they exist to serve others (pg. 29).
Having a sense of calling involves
both an internal and an external dimen-
sion. The “internal call” is a “private real-
ization that one is chosen by God to serve
the church as an ordained minister” (pg.
30). For a lawyer, Allegretti describes the
inner call as a desire to serve others cou-
pled with “an intuitive sense that one has
the right kind of talents, attributes, and
life experiences to become a lawyer” (pg.
31). According to Allegretti, “[t]hose who
enter law with the intent to bring justice
to a broken world, to vindicate the rights
of the weak and vulnerable, to heal bro-
ken relationships, to ensure equality to all
persons—these persons have responded to
a true calling” (pg. 31).
The decision of the church to ordain a
person a minister is what Calvin spoke of
as the “outward call” (pg. 31). Allegretti
suggests that we think of law school “as
the rough equivalent of the minister’s out-
ward call.” So viewed, the law school “is
the means to an end—it is the instrument
by which we develop the competencies to
implement our inner call to service. It is
the place where our inner call takes on
ﬂesh” (pg. 32).
byu law school professor David
Dominguez’s efforts to encourage law stu-
dents to remember and reclaim the ideals
that drew them to the legal profession can
be seen as a way of enabling students to
reclaim their sense of “inner call” that drew
them to the law. Professor Dominguez
places before second- and third-year law
students the essays they wrote when
applying to law school, essays in which
they often speak in idealistic terms of the
service they hope to provide as lawyers.
He then challenges them to bring their cur-
rent attitudes and plans into harmony with
this earlier, more idealistic self.
Having a sense of calling serves sev-
eral purposes. Seeing her vocation as a
calling places a curb on a lawyer’s sense of
self-interest, which “places limits on cer-
tain behaviors that have contributed
mightily to the current dissatisfaction
with the profession, such as the padding
of bills and the neglect of clients” (pg. 33).
Allegretti maintains that a lawyer “who
regards herself as having a calling cannot
help but see her clients differently. A
client is not a mere commodity, but a
human being, a human being in pain and
emotional turmoil, who has come to the
lawyer for help” (pg. 33).
The concept of vocation or calling
also has the effect of expanding the
lawyer’s moral universe. “The concept of a
calling gives the lawyer a kind of moral
compass: it constantly reminds her that
her ultimate loyalty is not to a client, or
to the Code, but to God” (pg. 33).
Allegretti acknowledges that it is not
easy to cultivate a sense of calling “when
our days are a chaotic jumble of constant
phone calls, impending deadlines, hurried
research, endless meetings, and no-time-to-
leave-your-desk-lunches” (pg. 35). Having a
sense of calling does not resolve all prob-
lems. Nevertheless, “a sense of calling can
help us endure and ﬂourish in our work. It
can put things in perspective. It can give us
hope” (pg. 35).
The Ethic of Care
Once a decision has been made to
resort to litigation, Allegretti notes, “there
is a near-irresistible drift toward all-out
warfare” (pg. 96). In response to the ques-
tion of what a lawyer’s conduct should be
during the conduct of a lawsuit, Allegretti
endorses Calvin’s “admonition about the
proper disposition that should accompany
a lawsuit” (pg. 96). According to Calvin, “it
is not out of order for Christians to pursue
their rights with moderation, so long as no
damage is done to love” (pg. 96). While
this may appear to set an impossibly high
standard, Allegretti maintains that “[a] law-
suit can be brought if and only if it can be
prosecuted without impairing Christian
love. If anger, bitterness, or the lust for
revenge infects a lawsuit, even a just cause
becomes unjust” (pgs. 96–97).
Building upon the work of Carol
Gilligan and Rand and Dana Crowley
Jack, Allegretti suggests that such an atti-
tude can be cultivated if the lawyer seeks
to develop an “ethic of care” rather than
just an “ethic of rights.”
In their research, Jack and Jack discovered
that while some lawyers conceive of the moral
life primarily as a matter of following the
rules of the game embodied in the adversary
system and the codes of professional responsi-
bility, others are more concerned with mini-
mizing harm and preserving relationships.
While an ethic of rights stresses competition,
the ethic of care emphasizes cooperation;
instead of rights, responsibilities; instead of
formal and abstract thinking, contextual rea-
soning ; instead of the fair resolution of dis-
putes, the avoidance of harm. [Pg. 100]
Allegretti cites a hypothetical case
from the Jacks’ research that illustrates
the difference between an ethic of rights
and an ethic of care. A lawyer is asked to
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imagine that he represents a client seek-
ing custody of children in a divorce
action. The lawyer inadvertently learns
that the client poses a risk of serious
harm to the children. The information
will remain unknown to the other party
unless the lawyer reveals it. If he reveals
the information, his client will lose cus-
tody of the children, but if he keeps the
information secret, his client will win
custody of the children. There is no
doubt in the lawyer’s mind that the other
party is the superior parent who should
have custody of the children. 
The ethic of rights focuses exclusively
upon the rights and interests of the client,
focusing upon the role of the lawyer as
advocate and nothing else. In contrast, a
lawyer motivated by the ethic of care will
place more weight on the best interests of
the child. This approach, Allegretti main-
tains, provides less certainty. Perhaps the
lawyer will urge his client to get counsel-
ing. Perhaps the lawyer will have devel-
oped sufﬁcient trust that he is able to have
a heart-to-heart talk with his client and get
the client to acknowledge that the child is
better off with the other parent. Perhaps
the lawyer will support the appointment
of a guardian to represent the best inter-
ests of the children. 
This hypothetical case brings into focus
a signiﬁcant shortcoming of Allegretti’s
book. Stated simply, it leaves unanswered,
in fact almost entirely unaddressed, the
question of whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, one would want to hire a
lawyer who manifests Allegretti’s transfor-
mationist ideal. If we would not want to
trust such a lawyer with the representation
of our most precious interests, it is difﬁcult
to see how we could justify seeking to
become such a lawyer ourselves. The ques-
tion we must ask is whether we would
knowingly choose a lawyer whose advocacy
is signiﬁcantly tempered—much more than
the professional norm—by values and com-
mitments other than our own best interests. 
It is difﬁcult to imagine a client engage-
ment letter in which a lawyer informs a
client that he will pursue the client’s rights
with moderation, so long as no damage is
done to love. If a lawyer would be reluctant
to give such disclosure to a client, it is difﬁ-
cult to imagine a justiﬁcation for secretly
adopting such an attitude.
In fairness, Allegretti does touch upon
related questions. We can easily imagine
ourselves as a client in need of a devoted
lawyer’s tough love, telling us to forsake a
course of conduct that would be wrong or
self-defeating. Allegretti quotes lawyer-
statesman Elihu Root, who said, “About
half the practice of a decent lawyer con-
sists in telling would-be clients that they
are damn fools and should stop” (pg. 51). I
suspect he is right, although doing so in
today’s legal market may be much more
difﬁcult for a lawyer who has been hired
for his expertise with a particular area 
of the law, than in Root’s day when 
the lawyer-client relationship was much
more stable.
The question I found myself asking
was this: If I am facing the loss of life, lib-
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erty, or property, is it in my interest to
want a Christian lawyer who is seeking to
live Allegretti’s transformationist ideal?
Especially if I am guilty, or if I am inno-
cent but the available evidence strongly
implies that I am guilty, perhaps what I
want is a lawyer who will be wholehearted
in his allegiance to my interests. Should I
want a lawyer who is going to “pursue
[my] rights with moderation, so long as no
damage is done to love?”
Allegretti does emphasize the impor-
tance of the lawyer as a friend who will
stand by his client, but my lawyer isn’t
going to follow me into prison. Maybe 
I don’t want a friend who will bid me an
affectionate farewell as I am led away 
in shackles, perhaps I want an advocate
who will do battle on my behalf without
reservation—the prototypical Code-driven
lawyer.
At times one feels that while
Allegretti recognizes this problem, he
does not altogether come to terms with it.
For example, in the hypothetical child
custody case, Allegretti stipulates that 
the lawyer is certain that the other party
is the superior parent that should have
custody of the child. But the more likely
reality would be that the lawyer is not
certain, although he might have nagging
questions about what is really in the best
interests of the child.
Allegretti’s ideal lawyer, we suspect,
might work quietly, perhaps even uncon-
sciously, against his client’s own interests,
while pretending to be a faithful advocate
and friend. Allegretti does not face as
squarely as he might the possibility that
the Christian integrationist might inad-
vertently thwart justice and the underly-
ing rationale of the adversary system by
acting himself as judge and jury of what
is best or right.
This is not to say that the integra-
tionist ideal does not deserve our alle-
giance. There is much about it that is
inspiring and encouraging. For one thing,
it does not let us off the hook by simply
invoking the lawyerly “role.” Surely there
are things that lawyers should do that
would be wrong to do in other contexts,
but just as surely Allegretti is right that
lawyers can use the Code as a rationaliza-
tion for turning off their moral lights.
Conclusion
Allegretti is not a lone voice calling in
the wilderness. The last few years have seen
a small deluge of books commenting
upon the deterioration of our legal
culture and lawyers’ many discon-
tents. Allegretti’s offering is dis-
tinctive in two primary ways. First,
it sounds a tone that is hopeful
and optimistic. Near the beginning
of the book, Allegretti notes, “This 
is not a book that expends much
sound and fury castigating lawyers
and the profession. This is not a
naysaying, doomsaying book about
all that is wrong with the law and
with lawyers.” (pg. 5) Rather it is an
optimistic book, based upon the
author’s observation that there
are many lawyers who have suc-
cessfully bridged the gap between
their faith and their work.
The second distinctive characteris-
tic of Allegretti’s book is that its recom-
mendations focus not primarily upon
the legal profession as an institution but
upon the hearts and minds of individual
lawyers. It is not a call for systemic
change, although there would be wide-
ranging effects if the book’s message were
widely embraced and followed. Rather, it
is primarily a call to conscience, an
entreaty to individual lawyers in their
everyday workaday lives, to recognize and
ﬁnd ways to minimize the gap between
their personal moral ideals and the profes-
sional imperatives that push them away
from their ideals.
Indeed, Allegretti’s book may best be
read as an example of what he calls the
prophetic ministry of the lawyer. “The
prophet calls the people back to their
covenant obligations, holding up the idea
of covenant faithfulness against the reality
of human faithlessness” (pg. 52). Similarly,
Allegretti asks the lawyer who also aspires
to be a Christian to seek to be their best
selves. Allegretti notes that the prophet’s
role is both to afﬂict the comfortable and
comfort the afﬂicted (pg. 57).
Allegretti’s book should be read both
by lawyers feeling afﬂicted by the
demands and constraints of their profes-
sional lives and by those who feel unduly
comfortable in those roles, those, perhaps,
who make the Model Two mistake of
believing that there is complete harmony
between their professional roles and their
obligations as aspiring disciples of Christ.
For the comfortable, Allegretti’s book
raises a warning that thoughtless adher-
ence to the Code may result in a moral
schizophrenia that will lead to the gradual
wearing down of the lawyer’s preprofes-
sional ideals and aspirations. For the
afﬂicted, Allegretti’s book contains a mes-
sage of hope that it is possible to integrate
being a good lawyer with being a good
Christian, as well as a number of useful
suggestions for ways of going about that
integrationist work.
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by Lovisa Lyman
ro b e r t  pay n e ,  n e w e s t
reference librarian at byu’s
Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, knew exactly what he
wanted to do after he earned
his jd from byu in 1999: pursue
an llm in environmental law
at the University of San Diego.
He chose the San Diego pro-
gram because it was a “focused
advanced degree in an area of
law that [was] difﬁcult and
lucrative.” But in a matter of
hours, one month before grad-
uation, his plans fell apart.
It happened when Robert
visited the San Diego campus
and saw where he would be able
to afford to live with his wife
Melissa, three-year-old daughter
Elena, and nearly-two-year-old
son Jordan (they had recently
discovered they were expecting
a third child, to be Thomas).
Robert, a totally invested father,
couldn’t countenance the idea
of removing his family from
their insulated Utah environ-
ment to live in such needy cir-
cumstances. Quickly he changed
his ﬂight plans—ﬁguratively and
literally—and returned to Provo,
as certain as he had ever been
that he was inspired to do so. 
But because he had been
planning on the master’s pro-
gram since the previous August,
Robert had not actively sought
a legal position. On graduation
day he was jobless and direc-
tionless. He covered his back by
picking up freelance research
projects from local attorneys
and started to polish his résumé.
It was roughly at this juncture
that a two-year reference librar-
ian position opened up at the
byu law library (Kristin Gerdy
had accepted a visiting profes-
sorship at Temple’s law school,
which vacated the position).
One of Robert’s newly-minted
résumés went to Gary Hill with
an unusually sincere cover letter,
which began: “I would like to be
a reference librarian for the Law
School. Never before, in my
three years here, have I seen a
job which I was more excited
for, or daydreamed more over,
than this position.” 
Although Robert’s skills,
interests, and abilities seemed 
to ﬁt the job, his journey to law
and librarianship had some
major detours along the way. As
an undergraduate, he majored in
English, concentrating, he freely
admits, on what he calls dwems—
dead, white, European men—
mostly romantic poets, and
nourishing his love of research.
Librarianship was Robert’s
choice for a master’s degree
after he graduated, but there
wasn’t a library program at the
University of New Mexico,
and he wanted to stay close to
his Albuquerque home. He
began a graduate program in
English with the understand-
ing that he could emphasize
library services, hoping to
work in a university library
and teach romantic literature
on the side when he graduated.
He was not too far into
the program, however, when
his father became disabled. 
To help the family, Robert
dropped out of school and got
a job at an export/import ﬁrm
in Albuquerque. The Spanish
that he had mastered while 
serving a mission in Chile 
contributed to his success, as 
did other skills. His supervisor
wrote about him: “Robert’s
keen sense of humor surfaces
with excellent timing in ways 
to add to the productiveness 
of the whole effort. He is an
enthusiastic disciple of the tra-
ditional values of honesty, hard
work, and loyalty, and I found
these values were consistently
conﬁrmed in his performance.”
Because of this business
experience, Robert entered the
mpa program when he returned
to school. Very quickly he dis-
covered this was not the pro-
gram for him, and he switched
to law, because “that was where
everyone had been telling me 
I should go since my junior
high days.” 
Not only did he like study-
ing law, but he had ample
opportunities to use his
research skills. For three years
he was employed as a research
assistant to Professor David A.
Thomas, two of which years
he was charged with training
Thomas’ other assistants, assis-
tants who now earn $75,000
and more, Robert is proud 
to say. Thomas characterizes
Robert as “a ferociously dili-
gent researcher” because of 
his excellent contributions as
assistant to the editor-in-chief
of the Thomas edition of
Thompson on Real Property and
as coauthor of two publica-
tions on methods of corri-
dor preservation. Robert also
worked as Thomas’ teaching
assistant for his ﬁrst-year real
property class. 
Both his research and
teaching were excellent train-
ing for Robert’s qualiﬁcation as
a reference librarian with the
particular assignment to coor-
dinate faculty reference ser-
vices. As do other reference
librarians, he teaches modules
of advanced legal research to
the student body generally, but
he also has the speciﬁc assign-
ment of teaching legal research
to the llm students.
After several months in his
new position, Robert still feels
he has made the best possible
decision for his family and for
those he serves. “I want to help
people ﬁnd the answers they
need. I want to do research and
gain knowledge as part of my
job, simply for the sake of
gaining knowledge.”
As for his future plans,
Robert, as well as those he
works with, hopes his appoint-
ment at the Law Library
becomes permanent. He would
also like to ﬁnally complete a
library degree, perhaps by dis-
tance learning, and to teach an
occasional class on campus
about dwems. More than any of
these things, though, he wants
to have plenty of time to spend
with his family. It is not
unusual for him to literally run
home during his lunch break
to read a story to his children
or to take them for a walk. It’s
at those moments that he is
most thankful he has the
opportunity to stay in Utah
and at byu.
A CHANGE INFLIGHT PLANS
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faced, Cole’s willingness to
meet the people in their own
cities and in their own homes
was a valuable ﬁrst step.
This whirlwind networking
was enhanced by a second for-
tuitous event in 1991. George
Fletcher, one of Cole’s profes-
sors at Harvard, who was then
at Columbia, involved Cole in
“Raising Rights Consciousness,”
a one-month training program
for talented young people in
law from Eastern Europe.
Others included on the fac-
ulty were Charles Fried, who 
succeeded Rex Lee as solici-
tor general, and distinguished
Europeans such as Andras Sajo,
who later visited at byu. Of the
experience Cole said: “While
for 15 years I had taught stu-
dents whose primary concern
was, what job am I going to
get, and what will my starting
salary be? all of a sudden, I had
people from all over Eastern
Europe who were asking, how
do we rebuild our world?” This
experience awakened Cole to
what a small group of people
can do in terms of having an
impact on the world. It also put
him in contact with some peo-
ple of inﬂuence who were
involved with all kinds of law
reform initiatives and were also
sensitive about ways that those
efforts could go awry.
While Cole’s instincts were
initially academic, his back-
ground in comparative law sen-
sitized him to what was
happening in Eastern Europe, a
change he describes as “being of
a magnitude seen perhaps once
in a century.” To add perspec-
tive Professor Durham notes,
“While there is stress associated
with a legislative session each
year in this country when legis-
lators are meeting to merely
patch up or amend legislation,
try to contemplate the quantum
increase in stress on a legislature
that has an entire code to draft,
starting from a point where
nothing exists.” After teaching
for two years in the Raising
Rights Consciousness Program,
Cole was asked to teach at the
Central European University 
in Budapest. He has taught
there every spring since 1994,
having earned the designation
of a “recurring visiting professor
of law.”
Another important point
of contact for Professor Durham
also had its origin in the 1980s.
The International Academy for
Freedom of Religion and Belief
(iafrb) was organized in 1985,
and Cole Durham was one of
the founding members. In 1991
he was made a member of 
the board of directors, and in 
1996, a member of the executive
committee. This organization,
because of the credibility and
diversity of its board members
and fellows, has turned out to
be a particularly effective vehi-
cle for carrying out multina-
tional comparative conferences
and consultations on religious
freedom issues. The individuals
involved in this organization
are a veritable “Who’s Who” of
religious freedom experts in the
United States, Europe, and
other parts of the world.
Professor Durham’s efforts
to sponsor international con-
ferences and publish a yearly
international issue of the BYU
Law Review over the past 15
years have helped pave the
the Max Planck Institute for
Criminal Law in Freiburg 
made him an extremely viable
candidate. 
Within two months of his
election, Cole became a mem-
ber of one of the ﬁrst teams
sent to then Czechoslovakia by
the American Bar Association’s
Central and East European Law
Initiative. His expertise in
German criminal law and the
associations he made while
researching in Germany assisted
him in forging several teams
made up of both European and
American legal scholars. In this
time of massive legal transfor-
mation in the former eastern
bloc, Cole Durham was in a
position to assist. 
In addition to formal invi-
tations, Cole became an itiner-
ant ambassador in Central and
Eastern Europe. With support
from the Law School, he trav-
eled through most of the east-
ern European countries during
the months of April and May
of 1990, taking overnight trains 
and spending the days meeting
with people. He established
ties with human rights organi-
zations, Helsinki committees,
and those in the legal academy.
Cole was willing to talk to any-
one with a link to the transfor-
mation of Eastern European
society. He introduced himself
as an ofﬁcer of the American
Society of Comparative Law,
and hoped the door-to-door
skills he learned in Germany 
as a missionary 20 years ear-
lier would lead to other con-
tacts. With the tremendous
need for advisors in Eastern
Europe and people hungry to
discuss the challenges they
by Scott W. Cameron
have you ever contemplated
the “music of the spheres”—that
ethereal harmony the Pythagoreans
attributed to the vibration of 
celestial bodies? On soft summer
nights you may hear it as you
close your eyes and visualize the
orderly progression of the earth in
its course around the sun, or you
may sense it as you think upon
the poetic movement of the galax-
ies in the immensity of space.
Amidst the harsh sounds
of the 21st century, we view
the universe too prosaically
and are prone to attribute cor-
relating occurrences to coin-
cidence. However, a review 
of the academic and ambas-
sadorial achievement of byu
Law Professor W. Cole Durham
over the past two decades con-
ﬁrms the Pythagorean view
that there is ethereal harmony.
Three weeks before the 
wall came down in Berlin 
in November 1989, Cole
Durham was elected secretary
of the American Society of
Comparative Law (ascl). Cole’s
colleague at the Law School,
Stephen Wood, who had 
considerable stature within the
organization, was the chair 
of the nominating commit-
tee and put forward Cole’s
name. Steve explains that 
Cole’s six years as secretary 
and then chair of the Law 
and Religion Section of the
American Association of Law
Schools (1981–1987), his receipt
of a prestigious Max Rheinstein
award to study in Germany,
and his connections with 
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way for expanded efforts in
organizing conferences and
promoting scholarly work in
the ﬁeld of freedom of reli-
gion. Since 1990, working indi-
vidually and as a member 
of the International Academy
Board, Professor Durham has
organized more than 30 inter-
national conferences. Each
October he has been able to
sponsor many of these inter-
national scholars and leaders
at a conference at Brigham
Young University. This has
been a great opportunity for
students with foreign language
expertise to meet with leading
experts and to use their lan-
guage skills in a professional
setting in conjunction with
conference activities. 
An important collabora-
tive effort between Professor
Durham and William F. Atkin,
now assistant legal counsel to
the lds Church, had its ori-
gin in 1992. At that time Bill 
was employed in Moscow 
by Baker & McKenzie as man-
aging partner of the ﬁrm’s
Commonwealth of Independent
States (cis) ofﬁce. Baker &
McKenzie had been hired to
lobby the Russian parliament,
which was considering a “draft
law” on religious liberty. Bill
suggested to his partner, Dick
Johnson, that Cole Durham be
hired to analyze the proposed
legislation. Professor Durham
spent the summer of 1992 work-
ing on a memorandum on the
draft law. His memorandum
was a scholarly analysis of each
provision of the draft law and
its strengths and weaknesses in
light of international law. Bill
said they had the memorandum
translated into Russian and
delivered it to the committee.
The memorandum was
clearly being used by the com-
mittee in drafting the legisla-
tion. It also won Cole and Bill
the conﬁdence of the person
who was acting as staff to the
committee. Cole suggested to
this individual that through the
International Academy they
could arrange a meeting in
Moscow with 15 or 20 people
from the u.s. and Europe. The
conference lasted three days.
Following a number of formal
presentations, talk about the
draft law in Russia began. By
the third day, the Russians
were saying, “Why do you
keep talking about draft law?
There is no draft law out
there.” Cole modestly remem-
bers, “We had the feeling that
we had sort of killed off a
fairly dangerous draft.”
Cole’s work on Russian
developments in late 1992 and
early 1993 prepared him for 
a succession of subsequent
efforts to help oppose or ame-
liorate problematic Russian
legislation. Three months after
the March 1993 conference, a
different and even more restric-
tive draft surfaced. This had
been percolating in back cham-
bers of the Supreme Soviet
during the spring and emerged
unexpectedly in the summer.
Cole was involved in u.s.
efforts to oppose this legisla-
tion, which was initially vetoed
by Boris Yeltsin, and a threat-
ened override vote came to
naught as a result of the disso-
lution of the Supreme Soviet in
the fall of 1993. 
During that time, shortly
after the standoff at the houses
of parliament in Moscow when
the Supreme Soviet was recon-
stituted as the Duma, Elder
Dallin H. Oaks of the Quorum
of the Twelve Apostles, Elder
Dennis B. Neuenschwander,
area president and member of
the First Quorum of the
Seventy, and Bill Atkin met
with the newly appointed
Head of Religious Affairs in
Moscow.
Seated next to the current
Head of Religious Affairs was a
bearded gentleman who was
introduced as Father Polosin.
Father Polosin had been the
Head of Religious Affairs
when the draft law was being
considered. Bill relates that
after the meeting, Father
Polosin told Elders Oaks and
Neuenschwander that the
memorandum that Cole had
authored was the “single best
and most helpful submission
received with regard to the
proposed legislation.” Professor
Durham’s measured delineation
of the legislation, section by
section, with thoughtful obser-
vations tied to international
law had been persuasive. Bill
indicated that for years the
only group in the u.s.s.r. with
signiﬁcant exposure to Western
thought were the lawyers who
read carefully and seriously
everything on international
law. Indicating that Russia
takes its responsibility under
international law and treaties
very seriously, Bill explained,
“Cole’s analysis was in the
exact format to be persuasive
to that group.” 
New drafts began to
emerge after the new Russian
Constitution was adopted at
the end of 1993, but progress
was slow. A fairly reasonable
draft was developed by the end
of 1996, but this was comman-
deered by some hard-liners 
at the end of May, and 
very restrictive legislation was
adopted by July 4, 1997. Cole
spent much of the summer 
of 1997 working with another
attorney, Lauren Homer,
preparing analyses of succes-
sive drafts and a compromise
version that was ultimately
passed when Yeltsin’s veto of
the legislation was threatened
with an override vote. Cole’s
network of contacts with
scholars, government ofﬁcials,
and other experts both in
Russia, Europe, and the u.s.
helped mitigate many of the
potentially harsh measures of
the Russian law. 
Recently, Cole was invited
to serve as a co-chair of the
Legislative Working Group of
the Advisory Panel of Experts
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us.” He also indicated that Cole’s
service was doubly appreciated
as he served without “wanting
something out of his service.”
In recognition of Professor
Durham’s work, Brigham Young
University and the J. Reuben
Clark Law School have founded
the byu International Center
for Law and Religious Studies,
with Professor Durham as direc-
tor. In a recent grant proposal,
Professor Durham described the
work of the Center.
The Center aims to encourage
interdisciplinary study that will
help explore the fundamental
values of freedom of religion
both as these have emerged his-
torically in the United States,
and as they are evolving in other
parts of the world. It will place
special emphasis on study of the
legal implications of these funda-
mental values and is committed
to do so taking a broad compara-
tive perspective. The Center will
promote scholarly study through
organizing symposia, colloquia,
lectures, and workshops that will
involve key church-state leaders
both from the United States and
abroad. It will promote dialogue
between scholars and govern-
ment ofﬁcials and will facilitate
the development of networks of
experts working in this area to
assure support for those working
in this ﬁeld around the world.
[The goals of the Center are
to nurture] relationships with
government ofﬁcials and schol-
ars who are shaping long-term
church-state policy, [to help]
strengthen commitments to the
universally accepted right to 
freedom of religion or belief
enunciated by the American
Constitution and other constitu-
tional instruments around the
world, and to organize a group
of experts who are assisting with
religious freedom law reform 
on a global basis.
Professor Durham is quick
to point out that there 
are many others involved in 
these same efforts. Professor
Frederick M. Gedicks, of the
byu law faculty, and Steven
Smith, now at Notre Dame,
have emerged as major thinkers
on constitutional theory deal-
ing with church-state issues 
in the United States. Several
other members of the faculty
have published and/or made
other scholarly contributions
in the ﬁeld: e.g., Kif Augustine-
Adams; Ray Jay Davis; James
Gordon; Brett Scharffs; David
Thomas; Kevin J. Worthen, ’82;
Jay Bybee, ’77; and Michael K.
Young, dean of the George
Washington Law School, byu
’73, Harvard Law School ’76,
who has a presidential appoint-
ment as vice chair of the
International Religious Liberty
Commission established under
the International Religious
Liberty Commission Act of
1998. According to Cole, Dean
Young’s appointment gives him
a signiﬁcant voice in inﬂuenc-
ing policy in the United States
and between the United States
and other countries.
While there is much to be
done for the cause of religious
liberty throughout the world
in the coming decades, in 
retrospect, it is clear that
Professor W. Cole Durham has
been quietly doing good.
There is a grace and symmetry
that emerges when looking at
the last 20 years of Cole’s life,
which evokes the music of 
the spheres. Any assertion of
coincidence or mere good tim-
ing seems a woefully inade-
quate explanation. With the
establishment of the byu
International Center for Law
and Religious Studies, we will
all keep listening, for it
appears there is more “music”
forthcoming.
compiling a comprehensive set
of the relevant constitutional
and statutory texts. We do not
know the laws of different
countries. No one does. You
can’t get copies of them. For
example, even people adminis-
tering religious matters at the
federal level in Moscow have
not been able to succeed in
keeping track of relevant legisla-
tion (often unconstitutional by
Russian standards) that is being
adopted in the regions. It is
vital to be able to get access 
to such materials so that it
becomes possible to analyze
them, to work on reform mea-
sures, and to improve practices.”
At the university con-
ference in August 1999, Cole was
awarded a prestigious University
Professorship. Due to his 
travel schedule, the installation 
banquet honoring Professor
Durham could not be scheduled
until November 3, 1999. One of
the speakers, Elder Dennis E.
Neuenschwander of the First
Quorum of the Seventy, who
has been personally involved
with the lds Church’s effort to
obtain legal recognition in
Eastern Europe and Russian 
for over a decade, commented
on Cole’s unassuming nature:
“Professor Durham was quietly
going about doing good with-
out signiﬁcant notice.” Elder
Neuenschwander went on to
describe the natural tendency 
to look for prominent people
when something important has
happened, “when in actuality
the work is done by those 
prepared to do it, and they 
generally do it quietly, and 
occasionally, in the words of 
the Doctrine and Covenants,
even the person himself “know-
est it not” (d&c 35:4). Elder
Neuenschwander indicated that
“the rest of us could do what we
did because of the context that
Cole Durham had prepared for
on Freedom of Religion and
Belief, which has been estab-
lished under the auspices of
the Organization for Security
Cooperation in Europe (osce).
This is an important initia-
tive of the osce’s Ofﬁce of
Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights and is aimed at
helping to promote better
implementation of freedom of
religion and belief in osce
countries (the u.s., Canada,
Western Europe, and all the
countries of the former com-
munist bloc). The panel of
experts has noted that no one
has a comprehensive oversight
on religion policies in all of
these countries. Cole has done
a background report on regis-
tration issues for churches. He
indicates, “There is a crying
need for more extensive infor-
mation so that we will have a
better understanding of the
legal framework of religious
freedom in these countries.”
Cole has been asked to lead an
effort to help gather key legal
materials in this area and make
them available through a Web
page. The panel of experts 
is also spearheading efforts 
in legislative reform, conﬂict
resolution, and education for
tolerance.
Efforts of this type make
sense, of course, to people from
many different countries and
faith traditions. But to Cole,
these take on a special signiﬁ-
cance in light of scriptural pas-
sages such as d&c 93:53, which
instructs that it is God’s will
that we “obtain a knowledge . . .
of laws of God and man, and 
all this for the salvation of
Zion.” Even in the limited
sphere of laws directly relevant
to freedom of religion, Cole
explains the difﬁculty of follow-
ing this injunction. “Even in the
relatively developed osce coun-
tries, no one has succeeded in
Cedar Heights, Maryland, an
all-black, mostly agrarian com-
munity about a mile outside of
Washington, d.c. Separated from
the nearest white community
by a eight-foot fence topped
with barbed wire, Winston
attended black schools and a
black church and didn’t have a
television to access the outside
world. “Hate was not instilled
in us,” he avers. Although he
realized that his father occa-
sionally came home frustrated
from his job at the Government
Printing Ofﬁce, he never heard
any details. In retrospect he
recalls that on those occasions
his parents would discuss mat-
ters behind closed doors. As an
adult, Winston learned that his
bright but uneducated father
was repeatedly passed over for
promotion during the 35 years
he worked at gpo and regu-
larly had to teach new white
employees their jobs, only to
have them rise to positions of
authority over him. He bore
this treatment quietly to protect
Winston and his three sisters,
but he could not protect them
indeﬁnitely.
In 1962, 18-year-old Winston
left home to join the Navy, and
it was then that he ﬁrst encoun-
tered racial discrimination. He
and some white servicemen
companions ordered a restau-
rant meal after which the wait-
ress markedly informed them
that they could buy the food
but wouldn’t be allowed to eat
it inside. His friends recog-
nized the slight before he did
and insisted that they all leave.
(Subsequently the restaurant
was placed off-limits to military
personnel.) 
While Winston was sta-
tioned in Washington, d.c.,
President Kennedy decided
that the White House honor
guard needed ethnic variety,
and Winston was chosen to
join the elite group. After an
extensive security investigation,
he became the ﬁrst black ser-
viceman to participate in ofﬁ-
cial White House ceremonial
functions, such as state dinners. 
A year into his assign-
ment with the color guard,
Winston’s unit was called on
for riot control when Martin
Luther King, Jr., delivered his 
“I have a dream” speech to a
packed Washington, d.c., Mall.
Winston and 10 other black
servicemen hurriedly conferred
about what they would do if
they were ordered to turn
their bayonets on their own
people. They agreed to lay
their weapons on the ground
and take the consequences.
Fortunately, King’s words had
a calming effect, and Winston
and his companions never
took an action that could have
led to court martial. As much
as he was wooed by charis-
matic King, Winston couldn’t
forget that his father’s dreams
were never attained through
passive resistance. Later Malcolm
X, whom Winston calls an
“eye-for-an-eye guy,” would win
his allegiance.
An incident in 1964 gave
him a substantial push toward
Malcolm X’s corner. As a joke,
Winston’s chief petty ofﬁcer
assigned him to carry the
Alabama state ﬂag in Lyndon
Johnson’s inaugural parade. As
Winston held the ﬂag at atten-
tion in the Sam Rayburn Ofﬁce
Building, a stranger approached
him and attempted to wrench
the staff out of his hands.
Others subdued the man and
someone told Winston that his
assailant was Governor George
Wallace, an adamant segrega-
tionist from Alabama. Later
that same day as Winston car-
ried the ﬂag on the parade
route, Wallace’s limousine was
right behind him. Each time
Clark Law School. Winston, 
a Howard University law grad-
uate with years of experience 
in government service in
Washington, d.c., brings hard-
won wisdom, a genial nature,
and a warm, open smile to his
recent appointment.
Named for Winston
Churchill, whom his mother
admired, Winston Wilkinson
was born and grew up in 
i m a g i n e  a n  a f r i c a n
American child growing up in
the United States in the 1950s
and early 1960s insulated and
protected from racial discrimi-
nation. The scenario is hard to
believe but true of Winston
Wilkinson, lds Development
donor liaison for the J. Reuben
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issue, his strong testimony sus-
tained him. Winston has rele-
gated the priesthood issue
along with other questions and
feelings about racial injustice to
a compartment at the back of
his mind. He says, “Blacks are
still ﬁghting battles in their
minds that have already been
fought in reality.” The gospel
helps him deal with the con-
tents of that compartment. 
The same year his family
joined the Church, Winston
began working for the
Department of Education
helping to draft national 
policy. Later, he served as
deputy assistant secretary for
civil rights at the Department
of Health and Human
Services, dealing for a time
with Title ix and women in
sports issues. His supervisor
was Clarence Thomas.
While Winston worked 
for the government, Gloria
worked for Church public
affairs in the Washington area,
making many contacts with
Church leaders and hosting
ambassadors from around the
world and visiting dignitaries.
Between the two of them, they
became well acquainted with a
wide range of people in and
outside the Church. But as
Winston’s tenure drew to a
close, they necessarily began to
look for new arenas.
When Winston was a
young boy in Cedar Heights,
he had dreamed of going West.
Now that desire rekindled and
in the mid-1990s he had an
opportunity to work in Utah
Governor Leavitt’s administra-
tion. When he came to Utah to
interview, he also investigated
an opening in the human
resources division of the
Church ofﬁces. He accepted
the human resources position
and became part of in-house
counsel in such matters as sex-
ual harassment. In 1999 he
moved to his current position
at lds Development where he
is assigned to the Law School.
His legal background, expert
knowledge of politics, and
wide acquaintanceship on the
east coast prepared him to
assume the fund-raising efforts
in the eastern United States.
Though new to fund-raising,
Winston sees his career change
as “divinely inspired.” 
Uniquely placed by his
experience to take on the 
interests of the Law School,
Winston is also eager to be
involved in and contribute to
his local community. A resi-
dent of Sandy, Utah, he is cur-
rently running for one of the
new county commissioner
slots and has wide-ranging
support from the constituency
because of his long govern-
ment service, community
planning skills, and compre-
hension of minority needs and
aspirations.
Winston characterizes him-
self as “three times a minority:
I’m a Republican, I’m black,
and I’m a Mormon.” In fact,
Winston’s experiences combine
to produce a complex, caring
individual who has successfully
compartmentalized the ques-
tions of racial injustice into a
place he does not visit very
often and which makes him
more determined to improve
others’ lives.
This background explains
his attitude toward his position
as donor liaison: “It’s not about
fund-raising” but “about saving
people’s lives.” He is particu-
larly concerned about the
many bright, capable students
who would not be able to
attend Law School without
donor support. He assures
potential donors that becom-
ing “part of someone’s life is
what giving is all about.”
he remained until 1981. There
he determined to become even
more involved in politics and
joined the Republican Party. 
In 1980 he attended the
Maryland Republican State
Convention. In the hotel lobby,
he passed a man he’d never met
before and suddenly felt
prompted to stop and ask the
stranger about his religion. The
man was Dallas Merrell, who
later became a member of the
Quorum of the Seventy. Merrell
responded that he was a
Mormon, and when Winston
pressed him for more details, 
he graciously invited the
Wilkinsons to his home for din-
ner and to meet the missionar-
ies. After two lessons, Winston
knew the Church was what he
wanted, but Gloria took a bit
longer to convince. She was
particularly concerned about
how they and their children
would be accepted in a white
church. Merrell assured them
there were black members in
the congregation, and they
agreed to attend. None of the
black Saints were there the
week the Wilkinsons went to
church, however. Nevertheless,
the members were friendly and
warm. (Winston admits that all
entries into new wards haven’t
been quite as warm. “For a sec-
ond I wonder if it’s because I’m
new or because I’m black, but I
prefer to think that it is because
I’m new.”) Once they ﬁnished
the lessons, Winston, Gloria,
and their oldest son were bap-
tized. (The couple’s daughter
and other two sons were bap-
tized as they came of age.) 
Some time after their bap-
tisms in 1981, when the family
was well established in the
Church, Winston discovered
that blacks had not held 
the priesthood before 1978.
Although it took him some
time to work through the
Winston slowed to a stop, the
driver eased the limo into the
back of his legs, nudging him
while revving the engine as
though he would run Winston
over. No longer was he insu-
lated from Southern hatred and
prejudice.
After four years in the
honor guard, Winston used the
gi Bill to attend Morgan State
University in Baltimore, where
he starred in basketball. There,
military spit and polish gave
way to an Afro halo and a Fu
Manchu mustache that reached
his chest. Similar changes
occurred mentally, and before
long he joined fellow students
at sit-ins, pitching tear gas can-
isters back at the policemen
who threw them. 
His growing anger was
tempered somewhat when he
moved on to law school and a
fellow student advised him
that to prepare for future crises
he must develop mentally,
physically, and spiritually.
Though raised a Christian, he
saw his spirituality as his weak-
est suit and began to search for
a belief he could truly espouse.
After serious introspection, he
and his wife, Gloria, whom he
had met at Morgan and mar-
ried in 1970, embraced Islam
and changed their names. For
three years he was a believer,
but he was still not entirely sat-
isﬁed. He recalls praying a
number of times for guidance
in ﬁnding the religion that
would answer all of his needs,
but not receiving a response. 
He was making progress
professionally, however. Upon
graduating from Howard,
where he concentrated on city
planning and zoning rather
than on litigation, he clerked
in the country attorney’s ofﬁce
in Prince Georges County,
Maryland, then moved to the
county executive ofﬁces, where
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Richard Fitt has been assigned
to byu Development as a donor
liaison for the Law School. He
recalls one of his early experi-
ences in fund-raising when he
worked for lds Foundation* in
Northern California. A local
cpa who is a member of the
Church contacted him about a
nonmember couple who would
be paying high taxes if they did
not give a charitable gift. The
cpa had outlined the vari-
ous educational interests of 
the Church for the potential
donors. When he mentioned
Ricks College, they perked up
and wanted to know more
about the school. Richard had
provided the cpa with a copy of
a video on a program for out-
door education of the handi-
capped, and the cpa invited the
couple to view it. Afterward,
they conﬁded that they had a
handicapped son named Rick.
Their gift of $300,000 substan-
tially furthered the Ricks
College program.
When people ask Richard
Fitt what he does, he often
illustrates his explanation with
such stories. “Fund-raising for
the Church is very missionary-
like,” he says. “It’s absolutely
clear that we are directed by the
Lord if we are doing what we
should be doing.” When asked
what they should be doing, he
answers, “All we do is build
relationships and help donors
do what they want to do.”
Like many involved in
fund-raising, Richard came to
the ﬁeld by a circuitous route.
Both his ba and ma, earned at
byu, were in humanities, with
emphasis on art history and
French literature. The vague
notion that he would someday
teach gave way to successful
forays into sales and market-
ing in the San Francisco Bay
area where he was reared. In
1985, almost by accident, he
heard about an opening for a
position with lds Foundation
in Northern California. He
learned that lds Foundation
personnel are employed and
staffed through Church head-
quarters in Salt Lake City and
deployed to particular areas or
assigned to speciﬁc projects.
Since Richard lacked the
requisite experience in ﬁnance
and charitable giving for the
job, he didn’t think his applica-
tion had much of a chance. To
his surprise, he was called in for
personal interviews and offered
the job. At the risk of seeming
ungrateful, he asked why he was
chosen over other applicants.
His new employer assured him
that ﬁnance and charitable giv-
ing can be learned, but selling
and people skills cannot.
Richard’s people skills were
immediately called into service.
He began by contacting past
donors; professionals involved
in charitable giving and estate
planning, including attorneys
and cpas; and ecclesiastical
leaders who are often consulted
about giving charitable gifts.
Next Richard made presenta-
tions to lds stake leaders so
they would know how to man-
age their part of the transac-
tion. In a bishopric himself at
the time (in fact, since 1980 he
has served as a counselor or
bishop every year but one), he
knew how burdened these men
were, so he requested that they
do no more than remember his
name. Richard follows a similar
approach for the Law School.
One substantial gift in
California came as a result of an
ecclesiastical contact. A stake
president found out that a less-
active widow in his stake
wanted to give a gift, and he
referred her to Richard. As they
visited, Richard discovered
something she loved. Before her
husband’s death, the couple had
gone on cruise after cruise—not
because they loved cruises but
because they found that a cruise
ship is a wonderful place to
ballroom dance. Richard told
her about the byu Ballroom
Dance Program, and she was
delighted with the opportunity
to contribute a generous mil-
lion dollars. Subsequently, she
enjoyed the results of her gift
when she attended many ball-
room competitions.
“You try to discover their
dreams,” Richard explains of his
approach, “what they want to
accomplish, their vision of the
future, and then try to make as
good of a match as you can.”
Large or small, “every
penny of any gift goes to the
project itself.” Modest gifts are
as important to the effort as
large ones. “It’s amazing how
helpful $10 can be when the
whole amount goes to a par-
ticular destination,” Richard
says. The important thing is
that the donor feel “good
about the gift and that it will
make a difference.”
In 1993 an opportunity to
learn more about the legalities
of charitable giving opened up
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directly with donors, though
his efforts also extend to attor-
neys who represent donors.
“The Law School has a natural
constituency—graduates of the
Law School and attorneys,
either byu graduates or not,”
explains Richard.
In approaching these
“extraordinarily gifted, incredi-
bly talented people” Richard
ﬁrst seeks to establish a rela-
tionship. “My job is so much
more building genuine rela-
tionships than fund-raising.
Naturally people realize when
you contact them that you are
interested in their money, but
they can see very clearly if you
are only interested in their
money.” Sincere interest cannot
be feigned and should never be
pushy. “Pressure takes away
from the charitable nature of
the gift, robbing donors of the
blessing of giving a totally vol-
untary contribution.” 
Publicity can also dilute the
joy of giving. Richard recalls
another gift he arranged. Even
now he is hesitant to tell the
details, since the donor insisted
on complete anonymity. The
diminutive woman involved
was a college science professor
who lived on pristine property
abutting a national forest. One
day an inexperienced logger cut
down a tree on government
land, which fell onto her prop-
erty, hitting her, breaking her
leg and jaw, and inﬂicting inter-
nal injuries. After six weeks of
hospitalization with her jaw
wired shut and months of
recovery, she ﬁnally received a
settlement from the govern-
ment. About that time, she was
diagnosed with bone cancer.
Since the settlement of $40,000
did not begin to compensate
her for the money she had
spent on her accident expenses,
she determined to give the
money to the lds Foundation
E. Lee Advocacy Program; 
Cole Durham’s International
Center for Law and Religious
Studies, which strives to
assure that religious liberty is
built into the language of
emerging constitutions in
Eastern Europe; and Richard
Wilkins’ World Family Policy
Center, directed at helping
families internationally to
stand against policy-making
institutions and people with
antifamily agendas. In addi-
tion, Law School liaisons seek
ongoing funding for scholar-
ships and professorships.
Currently Law School devel-
opment is setting up a volun-
tary organization for the Lee
Memorial Fund. “We need
participants in time and trea-
sure,” says Richard, who is
talking to alumni, law society
units across the country, and
other attorneys. “All you need
to qualify is a desire to make
friends.”
For the past 15 years,
Richard has made many friends
while helping generous people
ﬁnd the projects they can feel
good about and then assist-
ing them with the intricacies 
of actually giving their gifts.
“Most donors,” he has discov-
ered, “regard their wealth as a
stewardship, and they want to
use it properly. If they are lds,
they usually view their dona-
tions as helping to build the
kingdom as well.” They sub-
scribe to the Savior’s words:
“No man, having put his hand
to the plough, and looking
back, is ﬁt for the kingdom 
of God” (Luke 9:62). So does
Richard Fitt, whose hand 
is ﬁrmly on the plow of the
Law School.
*lds Foundation is the “umbrella”
department that oversees all fund-
raising efforts of the Church, includ-
ing byu Development.
40 Clark Memorandum
instead. She told Richard about
two causes dear to her heart:
byu—Hawaii and teaching sci-
ence to youngsters. Together
they drafted a scholarship fund
for Polynesian students who
wanted to become science
teachers. Her ﬁnal hope was
that she would be able to go to
Hawaii to set up a related tutor-
ing program. Against all medical
expectations, she went, lived in
Hawaii for two months, and
returned home to die a month
later. Richard admits he grieved
the death of this strong, deter-
mined woman: “You become
so involved with people that
you are almost treated like
members of the family.”
Though difﬁcult to heed in
this woman’s case when she
was so ill, Richard realized one
of the truths of giving: “Don’t
try to dissuade people from
what they want to do. The gift
is the donor’s stewardship. The
liaison’s job is to give options
and counsel.” As a footnote to
this story, Richard says this
donor continues to give. He
recently learned that with 
the settlement of her estate 
the Foundation has received
$50,000 to fund scholarships
for Polynesians and Latin
Americans at Church colleges.
The Law School is still
reaping the beneﬁts of Bruce
Snow’s and other Law School
donor liaisons’ work. “We
have helped to harvest where
they plowed and planted,”
Richard says of much of his
and Winston Wilkinson’s ser-
vice. “The Lighting the Way
Campaign was tremendously
successful. But now we are
plowing and planting for
future harvests.” Richard is
wholly committed to cur-
rent Law School projects, 
including the Rex E. Lee
Endowment, which funds an
endowed chair and the Rex 
in Provo. Richard and his wife,
Patricia (Tricia), had met at
byu and welcomed the chance
to return to Utah with their
three children. In the lds
Foundation’s technical assis-
tance ofﬁce, he joined three
attorneys in counseling donors—
generally through their profes-
sional representatives—about
ways to make gifts the most
beneﬁcial to the university 
and the donor. Their efforts,
geared more to the profes-
sional than to the giver, served
as a resource for attorneys.
Although Richard lacked a law
degree, he was the only one in
the ofﬁce who had worked as
a donor liaison before. Thus,
while he gained a healthy
respect for the legal challenges
of charitable giving, including
trusts, estates, and annuities,
Richard shared his long experi-
ence in the human side of giv-
ing. “Lawyers want to look at
all sides,” he says.
Though his time at techni-
cal assistance was mutually pro-
ductive, Richard missed direct
contact with donors. After ﬁve
years, he was reassigned to 
the College of Humanities and
the Lee Library, areas heavily
involved in fund-raising for
new buildings. Then in 1998,
when Development’s Law
School representatives Bruce
Snow and Larry Bluth moved
on—Bruce to become executive
director of Development for
byu, and Larry and his wife to
preside over the Mexico City
Temple Visitors Center—Bruce
invited Richard to assume Law
School fund-raising for the
western United States. 
Richard’s past experience
helped him better understand
what lawyers face in protecting
the university, its institutions,
and their donors and uniquely
prepared him for the new posi-
tion. Best of all, he still works
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